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Love wasn 't free, it came with great strings attached. It wa:; free for men but 
not for women, same as it ever was. 
- Joni Mitchel11 
INTRODUCTION 
Condoms break. Diaphragms malfunction. Even hormonal contracep-
tives are not 100 percent effective. More than three million American 
women become pregnant unintentionally every year/ and the rate of unin-
Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I am thankful to Kerry Abrams, Susan Ap-
pleton, Anita Bernstein, June Carbone, Mary Heen, Jennifer Hendricks, Ann Hodges, Holning Lau, and 
Carl Tobias for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. I am especially grateful to 
Corinna Lain, James Gibson, and Robin West for their insights on multiple drafts of this piece and for 
their extraordinary support. In developing my ideas, I also benefitted from suggestions made at law fa-
culty workshops at the University of Richmond, Seton Hall, and the Virginia Junior Faculty Forum, and 
at the Emerging Family Law Scholars, Law and Society, and Southeastern Association of Law Schools 
Annual conferences. For research support and inspiration I am thankful to Brooklyn Law School, the 
University of Richmond School of Law, and the Virginia Center for the Creative Arts. 
1 JON! MITCHELL: WOMAN OF HEART AND MIND (Eagle Rock 2003) (DVD's extra features). 
2 GlJITMACHER lNST., FACfS ON PUBLICLY FuNDED CONTRACEPTNE SERVICES IN THE UNITED 
STATES I (2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tb _contraceptive _serv.pdf. 
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tended pregnancy is especially high among young unmarried women. 3 
What is the legal status of unmarried lovers who conceive? 
Under current law, a woman who becomes pregnant with a man to 
whom she is not married is essentially on her own. Most states do require 
an unwed father to reimburse the mother of his child for certain birth and 
pregnancy-related medical expenses as part of his child support obligations 
or in connection with a paternity proceeding. But the law generally disre-
gards the physical, financial, and professional toll pregnancy takes on the 
woman herself.4 And where pregnancy ends in abortion, the man has no 
obligations whatsoever. The law thereby reinforces a fundamental gender 
imbalance: pregnancy is a woman's problem. 
Thus far, the law's main answer to this imbalance has been to expand 
women's reproductive choices by ensuring their access to contraception and 
freedom to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. With reforms on these 
fronts, some have little sympathy for the accidentally pregnant. Sexual li-
beration comes with responsibility, the argument goes. A sexually active 
woman5 who does not want babies should use protection. If she fails to 
prevent pregnancy, and chooses not to abort, she should deal with the con-
sequences. Demanding that men support "irresponsible reproduction"6 that 
they are powerless to prevent once conception occurs amounts to women 
wanting to have their cake and eat it. 
Yet reproductive choice is not the answer, because contraception and 
abortion alike tend to harm women more than they harm men. 7 Effective 
3 Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 24, 27 
(1998), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/joumals/3002498.pdf; Melinda Beck, The Birth-
Control Riddle, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20,2010, at Dl ("One out of every two American women aged 15 to 
44 has at least one unplanned pregnancy in her lifetime. Among unmarried women in their 20s, seven 
out of 10 pregnancies are unplanned."); see also Rob Stein, New Debate on Sex Education as Teen 
Pregnancies Head Back Up; in First Jump Since 1990, Rate Continues to be Highest for Minorities, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 26,2010, at A4. 
4 See infra Part I.A.2. 
5 Because the focus of this Article is on pregnancy, "sex" or "sexual relations" generally refers to 
penile-vaginal penetration. There are, of course, many other types of sex. See Susan Frelich Appleton, 
Toward a "Culturally Cliterate" Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L & JUST. 267, 286--87 (2008) 
("[Family law's] preoccupation with penile-vaginal penetration-not the usual route to orgasm for 
women--communicates the irrelevance of female sexual pleasure .... Family law thus constructs male 
orgasmic pleasure as worthy of concern and naturalizes an orgasmic sexual experiences for women."). 
6 Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HAsTINGS L.J. 339, 340 (1996) (defining "ir-
responsible reproduction" to include conception outside of wedlock and abortion). 
7 Although it falls outside the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that whereas both genders 
must contend with the risks of contracting a sexually transmitted disease, some studies indicate that 
women are more vulnerable to infection. See, e.g., Women's Health, STDs & Women: What Causes 
STDs?, http://www.womens-health.co.uk/www.std-women.htrnl (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) (''The rea-
son women are more vulnerable to infection than men is because the surface area which is exposed is 
larger in women. The vagina serves as a type of reservoir which lengthens the time of contact with in-
fectious fluids. Tiny, micro-injuries, which can absorb these fluids into the blood, are more common in 
women than men as well. ... The complications caused by STDs tend to be more severe for women."). 
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birth control-like hormonal contraception-poses serious risks to wom-
en's health and well-being, as does abortion.8 Women's freedom to choose 
between taking an unwanted pregnancy to term and terminating it, between 
the risks of condoms or of hormones, is hardly an unalloyed blessing. Only 
women bear the consequences on their own flesh. 
At its core, the problem with the legal status quo is that it treats all 
sexual partners who conceive as legal strangers. In reality, though some 
pregnancies do result from casual encounters, others result from intercourse 
that happens in the context of a relationship in which the expectation is that 
the couple will deal with the consequences of pregnancy together. Between 
the two extremes lie connections in which parties' expectations are unclear 
or inconsistent. A legal regime that treats all conceptions as if they result 
from no-strings-attached sex fails to protect the more vulnerable party and 
sets up the wrong incentives. No-strings-attached sex isn't wrong in itself, 
it's only the wrong default. 
This Article argues that unless sexual partners explicitly agree other-
wise, pregnancy should create a unique type of legal relationship. This rela-
tional default would come with certain obligations: in limited 
circumstances, a woman would be expected to communicate the fact of a 
pregnancy to the man with whom she conceived, and a man would be re-
quired to help support her during pregnancy and recovery. Child support 
obligations should kick in only once a child is born; until and unless this 
happens, a man's economic responsibility should be conceptualized as a re-
sponsibility towards the woman herself. 
The goal of this Article is to start a conversation about an issue that is 
critically relevant to our lives yet virtually absent from our laws. Commen-
tary on current laws addressing the pregnancy-related obligations of "un-
wed fathers" is sparse and the scope of these provisions is uncertain. And 
while theorists have written extensively on rape, reproductive freedom, 
family leave policies, public funding for abortion, child support, and preg-
nancy discrimination in the employment context, virtually no one has fo-
cused on the legal relationship between unmarried sexual partners who 
conceive. 
A number of scholars have begun to critique the law's hands-off ap-
proach to sexual fraud.9 But these scholars do not focus on pregnancy in 
8 See infra Part I. B. 
9 See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 777, 830-35 (1988) (arguing that the law is not at a point where deception is generally regarded as 
an impermissible inducement to sex); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My 
Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374,381 (1993) (ar-
guing that the existing adjudicatory system demonstrates an absence of authentic consent required under 
sexual fraud); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 871, 887-89 
(2005) ("The post-seduction norm of nondisclosure [that enables sexual fraud] represents a degree of 
complacency with regard to bald-faced lying that is almost unparalleled in the common law governing 
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particular and they are unconcerned with otherwise consensual sex that in-
volves no fraud or deceit. The work of scholars Linda Hirshman and Jane 
Larson does, like this Article, address the imbalance at the heart of the de-
fault code governing consensual heterosexual sex, but Hirshman and Larson 
do not focus on conception. 10 
Meanwhile, Martha Fineman has argued persuasively that instead of 
relegating responsibility for dependent care to the private sphere by subsi-
dizing marriage and marriage-like relationships, society should assume col-
lective responsibility for caretakers and their dependents.tt But even if 
Fineman is right, so far the world in which we live by and large leaves 
many pregnant women to fend for themselves. 12 Unless and until society 
steps in more robustly, requiring men to shoulder more of the burden is pre-
ferable to the status quo. 13 That is the focus of this Article. 
The precise parameters of the legal status governing sexual partners 
who conceive should be designed following a robust public discussion that 
has yet to commence. What I provide here is a preliminary sketch that I 
hope will be useful in beginning that discussion. I aim to reconceptualize a 
tort and contract."); Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REv. 817,893 (1996) 
(exploring the histciy of seduction under the law, and treatment of sexual fraud under the Field Codes). 
10 Indeed, though Hirshman and Larson recognize and do much to expose the injustice of the cur-
rent sexual default vis-a-vis all women, their proposal would make consensual sexual partners responsi-
ble towards each other only if they are engaged in a long-term relationship that involves some form of 
economic reliance or sacrifice. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE 
POLITICS OF SEX 281 ( 1998) (introducing the authors' proposal for a "statutory concubinage contract"). 
1 1 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230-33 (1995). The law should, she argues, support the vertical 
"Mother/Child dyad" rather than horizontal sexual affiliations (like husbands and wives). See id. 
12 See Rachel Benson Gold, Recession Taking Its Toll: Family Planning Safety Net Stretched Thin 
as Service Demand Increases, 13 GUTTMACHER POL'YREV. 8, 11-12 (2010) (examining the recession's 
harsh impact on women of reproductive ages and acknowledging that many women, even before the re-
cession, were uninsured without sufficient public support to provide sufficient family planning support); 
Christie Campbell-Grossman et al., Community Leaders' Perceptions of Single, Low-Income Mothers' 
Needs and Concerns for Social Support, 22 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING 241, 254 (2005) (noting 
that even where support is available, it is "difficult to navigate, often unfriendly, culturally insensitive, 
and ineffective in meeting the needs of single mothers at times"). Indeed, even California, a state once 
touted for its "landmark healthcare programs," Shane Goldmacher & Evan Halper, Schwarzenegger's 
Revised Budget Plan Is Expected to Eliminate Health Programs, L.A. Times, May 13, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/201 0/may/13/locaVla-me-state-budget-201 00513, has proposed limiting the 
state's Medicaid program for pregnant women by reducing eligibility requirements from 200 percent to 
133 percent of the poverty level, Tom Eley, U.S. States Slash Medicaid, GLOBALRESEARCH.CA, Feb. 22, 
2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=l7743. But see California Access for 
Infants and Mothers Program, http://www.aim.ca.gov (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). To address the unmet 
needs of pregnant women, Democrats for Life have proposed a bill, the Pregnant Women Support Act, 
H.R. 6145, 109th Cong. (2006), aimed at supporting "women facing unplanned pregnancies, new par-
ents and their children by providing comprehensive measures for health care needs, supportive services 
and helpful prenatal information and postnatal services." 
13 I explore Fineman's theory in more detail in Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2011). 
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substantive issue; I do not address the ideal administrative mechanism for 
implementing the new paradigm I propose. 14 
Part I lays out the problem. A fundamental gender imbalance hovers in 
the background of nonprocreative heterosexual sex: Women get pregnant, 
men do not. Women's alternatives-celibacy, chemically-induced sterility, 
or other, less effective contraceptive methods with abortion as a last 
resort--do not correct the imbalance. The current legal default is both un-
fair and inefficient. It imposes a rule that contradicts many people's expec-
tations, it exacerbates vulnerabilities, and it gives men who assume their 
partner will terminate an unwanted pregnancy no external incentive to pre-
vent conception. 
Part II builds on the work of Robin West to identify the core problem 
underlying the current legal treatment of sexual partners who conceive. 
According to West, modem American jurisprudence views human beings as 
essentially separate individuals whose primary value is autonomy, when in 
fact human beings are essentially connected as well as separate. The law 
privileges autonomy and privacy but human happiness also demands rela-
tionship and mutual responsibility. Viewing the legal status quo through 
this prism reveals its essential flaw: the law treats lovers as strangers. 
After introducing this framework, Part II illustrates how the same indi-
vidualistic framework that leaves a woman to deal with an unwanted preg-
nancy alone also gives her almost complete license to disregard a man's 
interest in the fate of his offspring. A woman has no obligation (outside the 
limited context of adoption) to notify the man with whom she conceived of 
conception, abortion, or the birth of his child. Pregnancy thus makes both 
men and women vulnerable-radically vulnerable-in radically different 
ways. 
Part II concludes with a comparison between codes adopted by some 
practitioners of controlled sadomasochism (S/M) and the default law go-
verning mainstream heterosexual relations. Like mainstream sex, S/M en-
counters involve unequal risk. But S/M codes explicitly recognize the risks 
and some practitioners formally agree on a no-liability rule governing un-
avoidable accidents. The current default imposes a similar no-liability rule 
on all partners who conceive, only without the explicit consent that is cen-
tral to many S/M practices. 
Finally, Part III proposes a new, relationship-centered paradigm for the 
legal treatment of sexual partners who conceive. Unless a pregnancy results 
from sexual fraud or coercion, or the parties agree to a no-strings-attached 
rule, pregnancy should create a legally cognizable relationship status. This 
status would require a minimal duty of communication and material support 
between sexual partners who conceive regardless of whether the pregnancy 
ends in birth, abortion, or miscarriage. 
14 In my next piece I will address the practical aspects of this project in more detail by proposing a 
first step towards comprehensive preglimony recognition through tax reform. See id. 
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I. THE MYTH OF FREE LOVE 
The typical American woman wants two children. 15 This means that 
she will spend "about five years pregnant, postpartum or trying to become 
pregnant, and three decades-more than three-quarters of her reproductive 
life-trying to avoid pregnancy."16 But no birth control method is fool-
proof. Half of pregnancies are unintended, and half of these end in abor-
tion.17 How does pregnancy affect a woman's life and what are her sexual 
partner's responsibilities towards her? As we shall see, the conceptual pa-
radigm undergirding the law's approach to pregnancy vastly underestimates 
its effects on women's lives. 
A. The Mismatch Between Life and Law 
1. Pregnancy's Effects on Women's Lives.-"[I]n sorrow thou shalt 
bring forth children."~8 Pregnancy as punishment-this is our story of ori-
gin. At the opposite extreme, modem culture tends to sentimentalize "ex-
pectant motherhood"-airbrushing away the pain and danger that are often 
bundled with its joys. None of these descriptions does justice to the com-
plexities of gestation and childbirth, which vary dramatically from woman 
to woman. For most, pregnancy is neither an illness nor is it no big deaP9 
(although some working women still feel pressured to pretend it is just 
that). 
Pregnancy is often a profoundly transformative experience, an earth-
quake in a woman's life. And women report feeling many things at once 
during labor and delivery-empowered and terrified, ecstatic and ex-
hausted, uplifted and radically vulnerable.2° For many mothers, the joys of 
childbearing unquestionably outweigh its challenges. Indeed, some women 
report experiencing a "hormone high" during pregnancy and delivery, de-
scribing childbirth itself as orgasmic. 21 But all pregnancies, even wanted 
15 GlJITMACHER INST., supra note 2, at I. 
16 /d. 
17 !d. at I, 4 ("About half of all pregnancies in the United States each year-more than three mil-
lion-are unintended. By age 45, more than half of all American women will have experienced an unin-
tended pregnancy, and about one-third will have had an abortion."). 
18 Genesis 3:16 (King James). 
19 See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abor-
tion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 342 (2010) (suggesting that "the idea of a health exception [to 
abortion regulations], however broad or narrow, incorporates an implicit distinction between normal 
pregnancy and the complications of pregnancy," and that the "distinction renders the inherent risks and 
physical burdens of all pregnancies invisible"). 
20 See CHRISTIANE NORTHRUP, WOMEN'S BODIES, WOMEN'S WISDOM 477-94 (1998); THE 
BUSINESS OF BEING BORN (Barranca Productions 2008); Welcome to Orgasmic Birth, 
http://www.orgasmicbirth.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
21 For resources on the pleasure of birth, see Welcome to Orgasmic Birth, 
http://www.orgasmicbirth.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
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and overall enriching pregnancies, affect women's health, freedom, and 
professional capabilities in ways that temporarily diminish their ability to 
take care of themselves. As Sylvia Law put it, 
The power to create people is awesome. Men are profoundly disadvantaged 
by the reality that only women can produce a human being and experience the 
growth of a child in pregnancy. Pregnancy and childbirth are also burdensome 
to health, mobility, independence, and sometimes to life itself, and women are 
profoundly disadvantaged in that they alone bear these burdens. 22 
As we shall see, the law recognizes only a fraction of these burdens. 
When a pregnancy progresses normally and is taken to full term with-
out complications, its physical effects are relatively well known, though eu-
phemisms used to describe them ("discomforts," "morning sickness," "the 
baby blues") are part of what some pregnant women see as the great con-
spiracy of silence around pregnancy. 23 Morning sickness is sudden, uncon-
trollable nausea and vomiting every day, sometimes all day, for months.24 
Other routine "aches and pains" include back and abdominal pain, chronic 
fatigue, anemia, insomnia, swollen feet, breast tenderness, leg cramps, 
shortness ofbreath, mood swings, headaches, dizziness, bleeding and swol-
len gums, heartburn, vulvar burning, urinary tract infections, constipation, 
and hemorrhoids.25 When complications arise, pregnancy can be debilitat-
22 Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 955-56 (1984). 
23 See, e.g., Lucy J. Puryear, Understanding Your Moods When You're Expecting-The Conspiracy 
of Silence, STORKNET, June 2008, http://www.storknet.cornlcubbies/pregnancy/moods-silence.htm. 
Some courts have reinforced this trivializing view of pregnancy's symptoms. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. 
Comerica Bank-TIL, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that employer did not violate the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act even though the plaintiff's absenteeism was due to pregnancy illness, because 
the plaintiff was fired based on her absenteeism, not pregnancy); Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 
F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (fmding that an employer did not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act by dismissing a pregnant employee who was suffering from severe and incapacitating "morning 
sickness" for her "chronic tardiness" the day before her paid maternity leave was set to begin); see also 
Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard Posner's Pragmatism 
and Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REv. 193 (1994) (discussing the Troupe case and Judge 
Posner's flippant view of pregnancy). 
24 Susan Renee Wilcox, Pregnancy, Hyperemesis Gravidarum, EMEDICINE, Jan. 13, 2010, 
http:/lemedicine.medscape.cornlarticle/796564-overview. 
25 See generally WebMD, Health & Pregnancy Guide, Common Pregnancy Pains and Their Causes, 
http://www.webmd.com/baby/guide/pregnancy-coping-with-discomforts (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); 
Merck Manual of Medical Information, Risk Factors that Develop During Pregnancy, 
http://www.merck.cornlmrnhe/printlsec22/ch258/ch258c.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); see also 
Christiane Northrup, A Woman's Nation: Reclaim Your Right to Birth Right, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 
16, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.cornlchristiane-northrup/c-section-or-natural-birt _ b _323422.html 
("According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the number of maternal deaths in the United 
States is probably up to three times as high as the number reported in our national statistics because not 
all maternal deaths are classified as pregnancy-related on the death certificate. According to midwife 
Ina May Gaskin, who launched the Safe Motherhood Quilt Project to bring this issue to public attention, 
the maternal death rate has actually doubled in the UNITED STATES in the last 25 years. It was 7.5 per 
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ing, even life-threatening. Pregnancy complications include gestational di-
abetes, heart disease, hemorrhaging, jaundice, severe nausea and vomiting 
leading to weight loss and dehydration, itching all over the body, and blood 
pressure so high it causes seizures. 26 
And every year hundreds of thousands of women worldwide die in 
childbirth.27 The risks of death remain significant enough that surrogate 
mother contracts typically provide the woman carrying the fetus with life 
insurance.28 But even "easy" births are rarely pain-free, including births in 
which pain-relief medication is administered-which itself comes with a 
host ofrisks.29 Common experiences during vaginal labor and delivery (the 
least risky birth method) include abdominal cramping, hot and cold flashes, 
nausea, vomiting, indigestion, diarrhea, vaginal tears, and back, leg, peri-
neal, and rectal pain. In many cases, the woman's vulva, perineum, or both 
are surgically cut to prevent delivery lacerations. 30 This routine procedure, 
called an episiotomy, may interfere with a woman's ability to enjoy sex af-
ter childbirth.31 
More complicated births may require a cesarean delivery-major sur-
gery that involves opening the woman's abdomen and sometimes tempora-
100,000 live births in 1982. In 1999, that rate had risen to 13.2 deaths per 100,000 births. By 2005, it 
was up to 15.1 per 100,000 live births!" (footnotes omitted)). 
26 See WebMD, Health & Pregnancy Guide, supra note 25; see also EILEEN L. McDONAGH, 
BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK 69-71 (1996) (describing the complicated physiological changes 
and physical exchanges between fetus and woman during even healthy pregnancies). 
27 See Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, Averting Maternal Death and Disa-
bility, http://www.arnddprogram.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); UNICEF, THE PROGRESS OF NATIONS 
48 (1997), available at http://www.unicef.org/pon97; see also Bharati Sadasivam, The Rights Frame-
work in Reproductive Health Advocacy-A Reappraisal, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 313, 343 (1997) 
("A staggering 585,000 women worldwide die every year due to complications associated with pregnan-
cy and childbirth."). Amnesty International reports that "maternal mortality ratios have increased from 
6.6 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1987 to 13.3 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006." AMNESTY 
INT'L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN THE USA, SUMMARY 3 (2010), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/dignity/pd£'DeadlyDeliverySummary.pdf. Maternal deaths are only the tip 
of the iceberg: "During 2004 and 2005, more than 68,000 women nearly died in childbirth in the USA. 
Each year, I. 7 million women suffer a complication that has an adverse effect on their health." /d. 
28 See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
29 See WebMD, Health & Pregnancy Center, Pregnancy and Signs of Labor, 
http://www.webmd.com/baby/labor-signs (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) ("[L]abor contractions usually 
cause discomfort or a dull ache in your back and lower abdomen, along with pressure in the pelvis .... 
Some women describe contractions as strong menstrual cramps."); Lewis E. Mehi-Madrona & Morgane 
Mehi-Madrona, The Medical Risks of Epidural Anesthesia (Epidurals), http://www.healing-
arts.org/mehl-madrona/mmepidural.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
30 WebMD, Episiotomy and Perineal Tears-Overview, http://www.webmd.com/baby/tc/ 
episiotomy-and-perineal-tears-overview (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
31 The episiotemy "can impair sexual pleasure by irreversibly injuring clitoral muscles, replacing 
erectile tissue in the vulva with scar tissue, interfering with the capacity to produce natural lubrication, 
and making future intercourse painful." Appleton, supra note 5, at 324. Appleton notes that despite 
these risks and the questionable efficacy of the episiotomy in aiding delivery, it remains "one of the 
most common medical procedures in the United States." /d. at 323-24. 
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rily removing her intestines before making an incision into her uterus.32 In-
creasingly, C-sections are also preformed when they are not medically ne-
cessary; today, one-third of births in the United States are by cesarean.33 
The risks of the operation to the woman include bladder or bowel injury; 
major infections of the uterus, kidneys, or lungs; opening up of the incision 
scar; blood clots; and uterine damage rendering future childbirth danger-
ous.34 The risk of maternal death is five to seven times greater when a 
woman gives birth by cesarean rather than through normal vaginal birth.35 
After childbirth, a woman may need days, weeks, or months to recov-
er.36 She may also suffer from long-term medical problems like diabetes, 
urinary or fecal incontinence,37 and uterine, bladder, or kidney infections.38 
On the psychological side, approximately eighty percent of women recover-
ing from childbirth experience mood dips (the "baby blues") for up to two 
weeks following the delivery.39 Hormonal changes during and following 
pregnancy can also produce more severe psychological symptoms which 
are now recognized as postpartum depression-a distinct clinical condition 
that manifests itself in prolonged sadness, panic attacks, paranoia, halluci-
32 D. Ashley Hill, Cesarean Section, CHILDBIRTHSOLUTIONS, 2000, http://www.childbirthsolutions 
.cornlarticles/birth/cesarean/index.php; WebMD, Health & Pregnancy, Cesarean Section-Topic Over-
view, http://www.webmd.com/baby/tc/cesarean-section-topic-overview?page=2 (last visited Aug. 28, 
2010). 
33 Northrup, supra note 25. 34 
eMedicineHealth, Cesarean Childbirth, http://www.emedicinehealth.com/cesarean _childbirth/ 
article_em.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 35 Northrup, supra note 25. 36 Compare WebMD, Health & Pregnancy, Cesarean Section-Topic Overview, supra note 32 
("[I]t may take 4 weeks or longer to fully recover [after a C-section]."), with Hill, supra note 32 ("Many 
women recover [from a C-section] surprisingly quickly and leave [the hospital] after a few days."). On 
recovery of the perineal area in particular, see Frederick R. Jelovsek, Vaginal Conditions After Delivery, 
WOMEN'S HEALTH RESOURCE, http://www.wdxcyber.com/npregl4.htm {last visited Aug. 28, 2010) 
("One study that looked at how long, on the average, it took women to recover various functions after 
normal vaginal delivery found that the median time (time for 50% of subjects) 'for perineal comfort in 
general (including walking and sitting) was 1 month (range, 0-6 months); 20% of women took more 
than 2 months to achieve general perineal comfort. For comfort during sexual intercourse, the median 
time was 3 months (range, 1 to more than 12 months); 20% of women took longer than 6 months to 
achieve comfort during sexual intercourse."'). 37 See Matthew D. Oldfield, Long Term Prognosis of Women with Gestational Diabetes in a Mul-
tiethnic Population, 83 POSTGRAD. MED. J. 426 (2007); Miranda Hitti, Anal Incontinence Lingers After 
Vaginal Birth: More Common with Anal Sphincter Tear, Additional Births, and Increased Age, WEBMD 
HEALTH NEWS, Dec. I 0, 2004, http://www. webmd.corn/baby/news/2004121 0/anal-incontinence-lingers-
after-vaginal-birth. 38 WebMD, Health & Pregnancy, Postpartum Problems, http://www.webmd.com/baby/guide/ 
postpartum-problems (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
39 University of Michigan Depression Center, Women and Depression, Postpartum Depression, 
http://www.depressioncenter.org/understanding/postpartum.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
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nations, eating disorders, and, in the most tragic cases, suicide or infanti-
cide.40 
Pregnancy alters a woman's appearance as well. The rapid weight gain 
associated with pregnancy often leaves stretch marks and increases the risk 
of developing obesity.41 Hormonal changes can produce acne, dark blotches 
on the skin, leaking breasts, rashes, brittle nails, thinning hair, and hair 
growth in unusual areas.42 Pregnancy may also leave women with saggy 
breasts, varicose veins, and abdominal and vaginal scars.43 
A pregnant woman also faces restrictions on her freedom. These range 
from the relatively benign, such as dietary restrictions, exclusion from cer-
tain sports,44 and the inability to travel, to the life-altering, such as pre-
scribed bed rest lasting several months.45 In addition, the "fetal rights" 
movement's legal victories have undermined pregnant women's medical 
decisionmaking freedom during pregnancy and delivery. 46 
40 !d.; Kevin Caruso, Postpartum Depression and Suicide, SUJCIDE.ORG, http://www.suicide.org/ 
postpartum-depression-and-suicide.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); Medline Plus, Postpartum Depres-
sion, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/postpartumdepression.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
41 Sally Ann Lederman, Pregnancy Weight Gain and Postpartum Loss: Avoiding Obesity While Op-
timizing the Growth and Development of the Fetus, 56 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S Ass'N 53, 53 (2001). 
42 Univ. ofMd. Med. Ctr., Pregnancy Guide, http://www.umm.edu/pregnancy/000214.htm (last vi-
sited Aug. 28, 2010). 
43 See id.; Andrea Thompson, Breast-Feeding Isn't Such a Drag on Breasts, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 2, 
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21599854. 
44 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 395 (2d ed. 2007). 
45 Novelist Rachel Cusk's unsentimental account of her own first pregnancy paints the most evoca-
tive picture I have seen of the existential dread that can come along with pregnancy, even when the 
pregnancy is wanted and the woman has a full-fledged partner. She writes: 
In the mornings, when I wake up, I observe the rising mountain of my stomach and have to fight 
surges of intense claustrophobia. With many weeks of pregnancy remaining I am marooned as far 
from myself as I will ever be. It is not just abstinence, stripped of the pleasure of the possibility of 
giving in to temptation, that grates on me; nor even the extremity of my physical transformation, 
nor the strange pains that accompany it, nor the surreally floundering being that writhes like a live 
fish in my stomach, nor the disempowerment I feel, the vulnerability to others' eyes and assump-
tions. . . . It is the population of my privacy, as if the door to my room were wide open and stran-
gers were in there, rifling about, that I find hard to endure. It is as if I have been arrested or called 
to account, summoned by the tax inspector, isolated and searched. I am living not freely but in 
some curious tithe. I have surrendered my solitude and become, for these nine months, a bridge, a 
link, a vehicle. 
RACHEL CUSK, A LIFE'S WORK 33-34 (2001). 
46 CYNTIUA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL 
RIGHTS {1993); RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS (2000); 
April L. Cherry, Roe's Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women and Impli-
cations/or Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723,732-33 (2004); Martha A. Field, Controlling 
the Woman to Protect the Fetus, !7 L. MED. &HEALTH CARE 114 {1989); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Crea-
tion of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Pro-
tection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 612-13 (1986); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The 
Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALL. REv. 1951, 1986 (!986); Katherine A. Taylor, 
Compelling Pregnancy at Death 's Door, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 103-{)8 (1997); see also In re 
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1253 (D.C. 1990) (vacating a lower court's judgment ordering a cesarean for a 
woman dying of cancer posthumously). 
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Finally, pregnancy transforms a woman's public identity. For some 
women, this transformation is exhilarating. For others, especially unmar-
ried women whose pregnancy was unintended, it may bring shame. Preg-
nancy "is a sign of female sexuality," writes Catharine MacKinnon, "a 
brand of having had intercourse."47 The derogatory term "knocked up" cap-
tures the many indignities to which unmarried pregnant women are sub-
jected. In extreme cases, the change in public identity exposes women to 
more than just humiliation; pregnancy increases a woman's risk of being 
the target of violence.48 One survey, for example, finds that pregnant wom-
en are sixty percent more likely to be beaten than women who are not preg-
nant.49 Professor Reva Siegel captures some of the effects of pregnancy on 
a woman's personhood: 
A woman may find that pregnancy comes to embody her social identity to oth-
ers, who may treat her with love and respect or, alternatively, abuse her as a 
burden, scorn her as unwed, or judge her as unfit for employment. . . . Preg-
nancy, and the period of lactation that follows it, are not merely burdensome, 
disruptive, or even consuming forms of work. They amplify the gendered 
judgments and constraints to which women are already subject, exposing them 
to material and dignitary injuries having nothing to do with the physiology of 
47 MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 44, at 395. 48 See infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text; see also Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 889 (1992) ("Mere notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering and 
violence within the family. The number of battering incidents is high during the pregnancy and often 
the worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy."); MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 44, at 
395 ("Pregnancy is a distinctive site of physical and sexual abuse. Domestic battering increases during 
pregnancy. Widely available pornography that makes pregnancy into a sexual fetish targets pregnant 
women for sexual aggression."). 49 See PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DURING PREGNANCY, 
http://www.paho.org/English/ ADIGEN A WPregnancy.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 20 I 0). Pregnancy 
might also be the result of violence. Women in violent relationships are more likely to experience an 
unintended pregnancy because their partners are more likely to refuse to use condoms or to prevent them 
from using birth control pills-flushing them down the toilet or physically abusing the woman for using 
the pill. See HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note .10, at 274 (citing a study that found 29% of teenage 
mothers reported having had sexual intercourse as a result of physical force); see also M. Jocelyn Elders 
& Alexa D. Albert, Adolescent Pregnancy and Sexual Abuse, 280 JAMA 648, 648-49 nn.4-7 (1998) 
(noting that "sexual abuse is a common antecedent of adolescent pregnancy, with up to 66% of pregnant 
teens reporting histories of abuse"); Mary Ellsberg & Barbara Shane, Violence Against Women: Effects 
on Reproductive Health, 20 OUTLOOK 1, 3 (2002) ("Women who have been sexually abused are much 
more likely than non-abused women to use family planning clandestinely, to have had their partner stop 
them from using family planning, and to have a partner refuse to use a condom to prevent disease."); 
Gina Wingood & Ralph DiClemente, The Effects of an Abusive Primary Partner on Condom Use and 
Sexual Negotiation Practices of African American Women, 87 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1016 (1997); 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND BIRTH CONTROL SABOTAGE: A REPORT FROM THE TEEN PARENT PROJECT, 
CENTER FOR IMPACT RESEARCH (Feb. 2000) (reporting the connections between teen pregnancy, domes-
tic violence, and birth control sabotage). 
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reproduction, and entangling them in relationships that profoundly define their 
identity and life prospects. 50 
All of these effects-from the routine to the exceptional-mean that 
pregnancy tends to interfere with a woman's ability to provide for herself, if 
only temporarily.51 Unpredictable bouts of nausea and vomiting, frequent 
urination, memory loss, and difficulties concentrating affect the most resi-
lient, dedicated workers.52 Self-employed women and those working on 
commission absorb the entire costs of the decline in their productivity. 
Pregnant employees may be in a better position, but not necessarily. Some 
employers accommodate their pregnant workers, others do not, and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides only limited protections. 53 Discrim-
ination against pregnant women also is prohibited generally under Title VII 
as a form of sex discrimination, 54 but pregnant women continue to face ex-
clusionary hiring practices,55 pay decreases, demotions, and firings. 56 Every 
50 Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,374-75 (1992). 
51 For a discussion of pregnancy and work, see Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women 
and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994). 
52 See Saeed Ahmed, Pregnancy Does Cause Memory Loss, Study Says, CNNHEALTH.COM, Feb. 5, 
2008, http://www .cnn.com/2008/HEAL THiconditions/02/05/pregnancy.memory/index.html; Univ. of 
Maryland Med. Ctr., supra note 42. 
53 For example, the Act covers only businesses with fifteen or more employees, see EEOC, Facts 
About Pregnancy Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-preg.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010), 
and even where it does apply, a plaintiff's chances of success in litigation over its protections are slim. 
A plaintiff bringing a discrimination claim bears the burden of proving a causal link between her preg-
nancy and the adverse treatment she received. She must also show that the adverse treatment resulted 
from a policy adopted in order to disadvantage her rather than in spite of its disadvantage to her. This 
renders many cases difficult to litigate. See Joanna Grossman, A Marked Increase in Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Claims and Other Key Developments Illustrate the Continuing Struggle of Pregnant Work-
ers-Including Pregnant Attorneys: Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns, FINDLAW, Apr. 15, 
2008, http:/ /writ.news.findlaw.cornlgrossman/20080415.html. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
55 See Jennifer Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on Hiring Decisions 
and Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497, 507 (2007) (providing empirical data showing that even 
where potential candidates offered "identical interview performances, raters [gave] less favorable hiring 
ratings to an applicant who [was] visibly pregnant"); see also id. at 497 ("[W]ith regard to pregnancy 
discrimination during the hiring process, several major companies have sett)ed hiring discrimination 
charges [filed with the EEOC,] including Wal-Mart and Dillard's Department Store."); Joanna L. 
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 575 & n.37 
(2010) (noting the escalation of pregnancy discrimination charges filed with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission). 
56 See, e.g., Rafeh v. Univ. Research Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (D. Md. 2000) (granting an 
employer's motion for summary judgment upon a finding that demotion of a pregnant employee was not 
discriminatory when based on her unsatisfactory performance during pregnancy); Wellborn v. Spur-
wink, 873 A.2d 884, 891 (R.I. 2005) (holding that a pregnant employee's demotion to a "fill-in" position 
following her pregnancy amounted to discriminatory treatment); see also Lesley Alderman, When the 
Stork Carries a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 2009, at B6 (noting the suspicion that in laying off new 
or expectant mothers, some employers are taking advantage of the "laxity'' of Title VTI by using the 
"dismal economy" as a subtext "to tacitly discriminate" against pregnant women). 
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delivery also entails a recovery period, and few employers provide paid ma-
ternity leave. 57 
In sum, the consequences of pregnancy go far beyond the monetary 
charges of visits to the obstetrician/gynecologist and of the delivery room. 
Whether conception occurs in the context of a loving partnership or a casual 
encounter, whether it is intentional or accidental, whether the woman is rich 
or poor, young or old, healthy or sick-pregnancy is hardly ever a minor 
undertaking. Pregnancy changes everything from a woman's pulse to the 
chemicals that influence her thoughts and feelings. It can present her with 
unparalleled opportunities for personal growth, healing, and joy and it can 
jeopardize her independence for years to come. 
2. The Current Law of Conception.-Vnder the common law, men 
had no legal obligations towards the women with whom they conceived out 
of wedlock. 58 Today most states require unwed fathers to participate in at 
least a portion of the "reasonable expenses" of pregnancy.59 Most cases 
dealing with the scope of these obligations focus on prenatal and birthing 
medical expenses.60 But what about other costs? Should "reasonable ex-
57 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires that employers hold open a job for a pregnancy-
related absence the same length of time that jobs are held open for other employees on sick or disability 
leave, but it does not mandate paid maternity leave. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Recent U.S. Department of 
Labor data show that just eight percent of private sector employers nationwide provide paid family leave 
to care for newborns. INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL'Y RESEARCH, MATERNITY LEAVE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (2007), available at www.iwpr.org/pdf/parentalleaveAI3l.pdf. 
58 See, e.g., Jelen v. Price, 458 N.E. 2d 1267, 1270 (Ohio App. 1983) (acknowledging that duties 
and financial responsibilities imposed by state paternity statutes on fathers of illegitimate children were 
"in derogation of the common law and must [therefore] be strictly construed" (citation omitted)); People 
ex rel. Lawton v. Snell, Ill N.E. 50, 51 (N.Y. 1916); In re Cirillo's Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952). 
59 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7637 (West 2009) ("The judgment or order may direct the father to 
pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1 
(2008) ("The father of a child which is or may be born out of lawful wedlock is liable to the same extent 
as the father of a child born in lawful wedlock ... for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy 
and confinement."); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-49.8(A) (2009) ("A judgment or order establishing paren-
tage ... may direct either party to pay the reasonable and necessary unpaid expenses of the mother's 
pregnancy and delivery or equitably apportion the unpaid expenses between the parties."); State ex rel. 
Reitenour, 807 A.2d 1259, 1262 (N.H. 2002) (relying on N.H. REv. STAT. § 168-A:l in finding that 
"[o]nce paternity has been established, the father of a child born out of wedlock is liable for the 'reason-
able expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement"'). 
60 See, e.g., Coxwell v. Matthews, 435 S.E.2d 33, 33-34 (Ga. 1993) (holding that a claim for 
$15,459 in pregnancy and birth-related medical expenses may be made in an action to determine the pa-
ternity of a child and affirming the trial court's order that the father reimburse the mother for the entire 
amount); Sisneroz v. Polanco, 975 P.2d 392, 398-99 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the mother of a 
child born out of wedlock had standing to seek reimbursement for pregnancy and birthing expenses 
while recognizing the trial court's discretion to grant or deny pregnancy and birthing costs); State ex rei. 
Dep't of Health and Human Res. v. Carpenter, 564 S.E.2d 173, 176 (W.Va. 2002) (requiring a birth fa-
ther to reimburse the Department of Health and Human Resources for $4,879 in birth and medical ex-
penses paid on behalf of the mother); Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 371 S.E.2d 583, 587 (W.Va. 1988) 
(requiring a child's biological father to reimburse the mother for birth expenses); see also MASS. ANN. 
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penses" include lost wages?61 Forfeited tuition payments? What about 
childbirth classes?62 Maternity clothes63-which can run to hundreds of dol-
lars for a professional woman? A breast pump? 
Judicial commentary on the scope of unwed fathers' pregnancy-related 
obligations is sparse, scholarship on the topic is virtually nonexistent, and 
many state courts have been silent on the issue. What is clear is that almost 
all references to the question focus on expenses that directly benefit the fu-
ture child. This is because states generally frame the obligations as an ele-
ment of a man's child support obligations64 or as part of a parentage order, 65 
LAWS ch. 209C, § 9 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2010) ("An order may be entered requiring a parent 
chargeable with support to reimburse the mother ... for medical expenses attributable to the child or 
associated with childbirth or resulting from the pregnancy."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-48 (2009) 
(adopting language from Section 62l(d) of the Uniform Parentage Act); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 7700-621 (West 2009) (same); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.621 (Vernon 2008) (same); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 160.636(g) (Vernon 2008) ("On a finding of parentage, the court may ... on a proper 
showing, order a party to pay an equitable portion of all of the prenatal and postnatal health care ex-
penses of the mother and the child."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-6!3 (2008) (adopting language from 
Section 62l(d) of the Uniform Parentage Act); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.570 (West 2005) 
(same); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2-813 (2009) (same); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 62l(d) (amended 2002) 
("Copies of bills for genetic testing and for prenatal and postnatal health care for the mother and child 
which are furnished to the adverse party not less than I 0 days before the date of a hearing are admissible 
to establish ... that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary."), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upalfinal2002.pdf. 
61 Many jurisdictions have been silent on the issue, but Minnesota, Montana, and Ohio-whose sta-
tutes are modeled on the Uniform Parentage Act-do not include lost wages as part of the reasonable 
expenses associated with the birth. See Bunge v. Zachman, 578 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998); In re Paternity of W.L., 855 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Mont. 1993); Jelen, 458 N.E.2d at 1270. Lost 
wages are also not included in reasonable expenses of pregnancy in Arkansas. See Taylor v. Finck, 211 
S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ark. 2005). 
62 See In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 929 (Pa. 1986) (construing the "reasonable lying-in ex-
penses" language to mean that Lamaze classes, prenatal care, and sonograms are not chargeable to the 
adopting parents to reimburse for expenses on behalf of the natural mother). The court in Taylor relied 
on this holding in denying a birth mother reimbursement for such expenses from the birth father. 211 
S.W.3d at 537. 
63 See Taylor, 211 S.W.3d at 537 (holding that lying-in expenses "normally would not include items 
such as maternity clothes, lost wages, or counseling"). 
64 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/14 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600B.l (West 2001); 
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1552 (1998 & Supp. 
2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 9 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 722.712 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-7 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT ANN.§ 43-
1407 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-45 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 49-15 (West 
2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.155 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1 (2003); UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 78B-15-305 (2008); W.VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-1-244 (LexisNexis 2009). 
65 See ALA. CODE§ 26-17-636(g) (LexisNexis 2009); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-10-110 (2009); ARIZ. 
REv. STAT. § 25-809 (LexisNexus 2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7637 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-4-116(3)(a) (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-172a (West 2009) (when a father 
comes forward as parent); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.031(1) (Supp. 2005); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 584-
15(c) (LexisNexis 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 38-112l(c) (2009); MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-1033 
(LexisNexis 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.66(3) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.841 (West 
2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-116 (2009); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.161 (LexisNexis 2004 & 
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not as a duty towards the woman in her own right. The rationale behind 
this approach stems from the now widely accepted imperative that children 
of unmarried parents should not be relegated to the legal no-man's land of 
"illegitimacy."66 All fifty states now require both parents to support their 
offspring regardless of their marital status.67 Since a child's prebirth health 
cannot be disentangled from the health of his or her expectant mother, child 
support begins in utero.68 Thus, even though the real costs of pregnancy go 
beyond expenses related to the health and well-being of the fetus, a 
straightforward interpretation of many states' laws excludes many of these 
costs from the man's obligations. 
These laws not only underestimate the burdens of pregnancy, but they 
also imply that pregnancy is a liminal state significant only by reference to 
the child it may-but will not always-produce. Additionally, because the 
man's pregnancy-related liability attaches only after paternity has been es-
tablished, it is almost always retroactive: a reimbursement for expenses af-
ter the child is born rather than as the expenses accrue. Thus, the woman 
must bear the overwhelming majority of the costs during the nine months of 
pregnancy and beyond, until and unless a paternity proceeding is com-
Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-57 (2009); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.13 (West 2005); 
TENN. CODE. ANN.§ 36-2-311 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.636(g) (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-49.8(A) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.130 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 767.89 (West 2009). 
66 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW AND FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (2002) (''Historically, the law did not treat children of formal and informal 
relationships equally with respect to parental support. In a series of cases beginning in the late 1960s, 
the United States Supreme Court held that most legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital child-
ren violate the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, it is now generally 
accepted that children of informal and formal relationships must be treated equally with respect to the 
amount and duration of child support."). 
67 See Jeffery W. Santema, Annotation, Liability of Father for Retroactive Child Support on Judi-
cial Determination of Paternity, 87 A.L.R.5th 361, §I (2002) ("The parents of a child born out of wed-
lock have an obligation to support the child. . . . It is the fact of paternity or maternity, not that of 
marriage, that obligates the parents to nourish and rear the child. Hence, the support rights of children 
born out of wedlock are the same as those of children born in wedlock."). 
68 See Coxwell v. Matthews, 435 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Ga. 1993) (holding that "the duty to protect and 
maintain a child includes the duty to ensure that the child receives adequate medical care prior to and 
during birth"). This same case mentions the lost earnings that pregnancy may spell for a woman, but it 
nevertheless confines the man's obligation to prenatal and birthing expenses. See id. (stating that were 
the court ''to hold that the father of an out-of-wedlock child has no obligation to pay the birthing ex-
penses of his child, that duty would fall either on the mother, whose condition, in some circumstances, 
might impair her earning ability, or on the state"). The concurrence in Coxwell also suggests that pre-
natal and birthing expenses should be shared as a matter of gender equity, although it does not recognize 
that gender equity may translate into a much broader liability. See id. at 35 (Sears-Collins, J., concur-
ring) ("A healthy pregnancy and birth are essential for a healthy child. Therefore, the conclusion is in-
escapable that the duty to provide for a child's maintenance and protection incorporates expenses 
incurred by the mother due to pregnancy and birth. This is especially true in view of (a) changing fami-
ly roles and the modem economic partnership concept of parenthood, (b) growing recognition that the 
relationship between a father and his child is important for more reasons than the provision of food, 
clothing, and shelter, and (c) efforts in recent years to eliminate sex discrimination."). 
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pleted. If no child is born, a woman who can establish paternity during 
pregnancyli9 might still be entitled to some support under one of the statutes 
discussed above even if she eventually miscarries, but cases addressing this 
issue are rare. 70 
A minority of states extend a man's pregnancy-related obligations 
beyond the narrow scope guided by the best interests of the child to encom-
pass duties to the woman in her own right. Most notably, Delaware's do-
mestic relations statute dedicates an independent code section to the "[ d]uty 
to support woman with child conceived out of wedlock." This provision 
empowers judges to allocate the costs of pregnancy and birth as they see fit: 
The duty to support a woman pregnant with child conceived out of wedlock 
rests first upon the person by whom she became pregnant. Such support may 
include her necessary prenatal and postnatal medical, hospital, and lying-in 
expenses incident to the pregnancy and to birth of the child, and such other re-
lief as to the court shall seem reasonable. 71 
Yet despite this broad statutory language, there is little indication that De-
laware courts have awarded pregnant women anything in excess of the 
amount typically available in other states under the child support rubric: 
reimbursement for medical expenses directly related to pregnancy and 
69 Though technological developments have made it possible to conduct genetic testing in utero, 
such testing poses a risk to the health of both mother and fetus. See Am. Pregnancy Ass'n, Paternity 
Testing, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/prenataltesting/patemitytesting.html (last visited May 29, 
2010). For this reason, a court may not order genetic testing until the child is born. A mother may, 
however, volunteer to pursue a prenatal test for paternity. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 502(c) & com-
ments (amended 2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/b1Varchives/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf. 
70 But see C. v. L., 305 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969) (holding that the termination of preg-
nancy did not divest a woman of her right to proceed with such a claim and that the cost of a therapeutic 
(i.e., medically indicated) abortion can be awarded at the court's discretion as a "reasonable expense" in 
connection with pregnancy); see also Stockton v. Oldenburg, 713 N.E.2d 259, 266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 
(Myerscough, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing there is a broad scope to reasonable 
expense in connection with pregnancy that encompasses therapeutic abortion). But see Alice D. v. Wil-
liam M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (requiring actual birth as a predicate for reasona-
ble expense award and differentiating itself from C. v. L. at 353: "mandating an actual birth as a 
predicate for relief in the Family Court is sound"). 
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 504 (2009). The New York legislature has also created a separate duty 
that the father owes to the mother: "The father is liable to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's 
confinement and such reasonable expenses in connection with her pregnancy as the court in its discre-
tion may deem proper." FAM. CT. ACT§ 514 (2010); see Tuer v. Niedoliwka, 285 N.W.2d 424,426-27 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (distinguishing between a woman's right to reimbursement for a share of her 
pregnancy and confinement expense-a right which she may contract away-and her child's right to 
support-a right which she may not contract away); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 265 N.Y.S.2d 827 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1965) (holding that Section 514 of the New York Family Court Act authorizes a court to 
require the father of a child involved in a filiation proceeding to pay the cost of necessary psychiatric 
care where there is a patently clear causal relationship between the need for psychotherapy and the 
mother's pregnancy, confinement, and recovery (but refusing to do so in the case because the mother 
failed to sufficiently establish this relationship)). 
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childbirth.72 Delaware's Code also includes an alternative provision giving 
courts the authority to order a man to pay for prenatal, postnatal, and lying-
in expenses as part of his child support obligations rather than as a financial 
obligation to the woman.73 As we have seen, the effects of pregnancy on 
women's lives extend far beyond medical bills. In order to survive and 
thrive during and immediately following pregnancy, women need support, a 
lot more support than the law guarantees them. 
B. Choice Is Not the Answer 
Recognizing the gap between pregnant women's needs and their en-
titlements, feminists have worked hard to secure women's rights to contra-
ception and abortion. 74 Their efforts over the last few decades have ushered 
in dramatic expansions in women's reproductive freedom through wa-
tershed cases like Eisenstadt v. Baird75 and Roe v. Wade. 76 These advances 
leave some with limited sympathy for the accidentally pregnant. Consider-
ing the panoply of contraceptive options available to women today, what 
excuse does a woman have for waking up pregnant? Many people believe 
that sexual freedom comes with responsibility for the consequences. A 
woman who engages in sexual relations assumes the risk that she might 
conceive. Even once she does "fall" pregnant, a woman has a choice. If 
she is unprepared to take on the hardships of pregnancy and childbirth, she 
can abort. If she chooses to take the pregnancy to term after all, she should 
take care of herself. By this logic, the asymmetry in choice (women's un-
72 See Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rei. Harper v. Barrows, 570 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Del. 
1990) (stating that the court has the authority to require the incarcerated father of a child born out of 
wedlock to pay for post-natal expenses incurred by the mother relating to the birth of their child in the 
amount of $620); DCES/J.O'C. v. D.U., 2009 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 18, 
2009) (discussing only out-of-pocket delivery expenses in connection with a man's pregnancy-related 
obligation). In this case, however, the obligation fell under a parallel, retroactive child support provision 
(Section 513) rather than under Section 504. !d. Nevertheless, though the case addresses the difference 
in the statute of limitations applicable to the two provisions, it makes no mention of the possibility that a 
different monetary outcome would result from an obligation falling under one section or the other. 
73 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 513(a)(3) (2009); see also DCES/J.O'C., 2009 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS at 
5 (explaining that the Delaware statute treats pregnancy-related medical bills and retroactive child sup-
port as separate obligations under Section 504 and Section 513(a)(3) respectively, but that "where a duty 
of support has been determined, the Court may order the obligor to pay the cost of prenatal, postnatal 
and lying-in expenses, allowing the expenses Mother claims to fall under child support, not financial 
support for Mother"). 
74 For discussions of sex-equality based arguments for reproductive freedom, see CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93 (1987); Law, su-
pra note 22, at 978; Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1621-22 (1979); 
Siegel, supra note 50; Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical 
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). 
75 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (guaranteeing access to contraception regardless of 
marital status). 
76 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, !53 (1973) (guaranteeing a woman's right to a first trimester abor-
tion). 
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ilateral decisionmaking power over abortion) counterbalances the asymme-
try in sexual risk (women's exposure to unwanted pregnancy). The two 
may be apples and oranges, but there is arguably a rough justice in the cur-
rent rule. 
This argument belittles the harms that come along with all of women's 
reproductive choices. The "problem with the rhetoric of choice," writes one 
author focusing on broader gender equity issues, "is that it leaves out pow-
er. Those who benefit from the status quo always attribute inequities to the 
choices of the underdog."77 No form ofbirth control is foolproof, and effec-
tive contraception as well as abortion come at great costs, costs that are paid 
almost entirely by women. 
For example, although pharmaceutical companies work hard to create 
the impression that hormonal contraception, commonly known simply as 
"the pill," is not only safe but good for you, its harmful side effects are in-
controvertible. Documented risks include strokes, heart attacks, migraine 
headaches, cancer, diabetes, asthma, breast pains, vaginal dryness and in-
fections, and loss of sexual desire. 78 According to some studies, newer 
"third generation" pills developed in the 1980s to reduce earlier pills' minor 
side effects like acne or facial hair actually double the risk of blood clots-
which can result in a stroke, deep vein thrombosis, or pulmonary embol-
ism.79 Women who are aware of these risks presumably feel the pill's bene-
77 ANN CRIITENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 234 (2001). Crittenden's book provided the in-
spiration for the title of this Article. 78 See A.A. Ewies, Levonorgestrel-Releasing Intrauterine System-The Discontinuing Story, 36 
GYNECOL ENDOCRINOL 1 (2009); Chrisandra L. Shufelt & C. Noel Bairey Merz, Contraceptive Hor-
mone Use and Cardiovascular Disease, 53 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 221 (2009); Sasitom Siritho et a!., 
Risk of Ischemic Stroke Among Users of the Oral Contraceptive Pill, 34 STROKE 1575 (2003); Nat'! 
Cancer lnst., Oral Contraceptives and Cancer Risk: Question and Answers, May 4, 2006, 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet!Risk/oral-contraceptives (linking oral contraceptives to an 
increase in some forms of cancer and a decrease in others); Oral Contraceptives Linked to Asthma Risk, 
REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.cornlarticle/healthNews/idUSTRE52Q6PA20090327; Pros 
and Cons of the Pill Tricky For Black Women, REUTERS, June 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/healthNews/idUSTON07346120080630 (describing a study showing black women at a lower risk 
of heart disease and diabetes from oral contraceptives than white women); Geraldine Sealey, Why I Hate 
the Pill, SALON.COM, May 3, 2010, http://www.salon.com/life/feature/2010/05/03/pill_pushback ("Al-
though a libido-destroying pill does wonders to lower your pregnancy risk, it's also done a number on 
my relationships, self-esteem and emotional well-being."). 
19 Ads marketing the newest invention-the "ring" (a plastic device that releases hormones directly 
into the vagina)-are especially misleading. The ads-which feature the slogan: "Let Freedom 
Ring!" -emphasize the fact that the ring contains a lower dose of hormones than most oral contracep-
tives. This is true, but studies suggest that the mode of delivery may increase certain risks. Since the 
ring, like the patch, releases hormones directly into the blood stream, the net amount of hormones ab-
sorbed by the body may be higher than those absorbed by women taking hormones orally. The company 
that manufactures the ring is facing over 100 pending lawsuits. See Stephanie Mencimer, Is NuvaRing 
Dangerous?, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2009, http://www.motheJjones.com/environment/2009/05/ 
nuvaring-dangerous. Similarly, Bayer ads presenting the pill as a beneficial "lifestyle drug"-to combat 
acne, headaches, and anxiety-resulted in a lawsuit by the Food and Drug Administration and the attor-
neys general of twenty-seven states claiming Bayer underplayed the drug's dangers. The case ended in 
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fits outweigh its potential harms, but in this tradeoff most of the downsides 
fall on the woman (although men suffer too when their partners' libido and 
natural lubrication are inhibited, or when the women they love suffer from 
more drastic side effects). 
Furthermore, hormonal contraception is not accessible to all women. 
Pill refills can cost up to $50 per month, 80 they require a prescription and 
repeated physician appointments, and they are often not covered by insur-
ance.81 A recent study has found that "many women have difficulty pre-
venting unintended pregnancy simply because they cannot afford the more 
effective, prescription methods of contraception."82 Despite all of the ad-
vances, birth control remains, as it was in Margaret Sanger's time, "a wom-
an's problem."83 
Abortions, likewise, are hardly good for women. Whether one consid-
ers a fetus to be a life or not, every woman understands that it is at least a 
potential life. The decision to terminate a pregnancy, even when it 
represents a woman's best alternative, can be a heart-wrenching ordeal.84 
And then, of course, there are routine physical side effects like abdominal 
cramping, irregular bleeding, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. 85 When an 
a settlement requiring that the company launch a $20 million corrective ad campaign. See Natasha 
Singer, A Birth Control Pill That Promised Too Much, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 2009, at B I. 
80 Planned Parenthood, Birth Control Pills, http://www.plannedparenthood.org!health-topicslbirth-
controllbirth-control-pill-4228.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 20 10). 81 See Sharon Lerner, Why Doesn't Health Care Cover Birth Control?, DOUBLEX, Nov. 12, 2009, 
http://www.doublex.com/sectionlnews-politics/why-doesnt-health-care-cover-birth-control; Geraldine 
Sealey, Erections Get Insurance; Why Not the Pill?, ABC NEWS, June 19, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/story?id=91538. 82 JACQUELINE E. DARROCH, JENNIFER J. FROST & LISA REMEZ, GUTTMACHER lNST., IN BRIEF: 
IMPROVING CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 6 (2008), available at http://www. 
guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/05/09/lmprovingContraceptiveUse.pdf ("More than one in five public pro-
viders report that the majority of their contraceptive clients have difficulty paying for visits, and another 
third think that such difficulties affect a sizable proportion of clients. Among private providers, more 
than half believe that a sizable minority of their clients have payment problems."). 
83 MARGARET SANGER, WOMAN AND THE NEW RACE I 00 (1920). 
84 See Project Voice, http://www.theabortionproject.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); WebMD, 
Emotional Reactions After an Abortion, http://www.webmd.com/hw-popup/emotional-reactions-after-
an-abortion (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) ("Natural hormonal changes that occur in your body during 
pregnancy are affected by an abortion. These hormonal changes can make you feel more emotional than 
usual. You may experience a spectrum of feelings, ranging from sadness, anger, and regret to guilt or 
relief. In fact, hormonal changes can cause depression symptoms, including sleeplessness (insomnia), 
sadness, tearfulness, anxiety, hopelessness, irritability, and poor concentration."). I do not, however, 
mean to suggest that the emotional aspects of the procedure justify abortion restrictions. For discussions 
of debates surrounding the woman-protective rationale for restricting abortion, see Reva B. Siegel, The 
Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 
57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008), and Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion 
Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2010). 
85 Am. Pregnancy Ass'n, Unplanned Pregnancy: Possible Physical Side Effects (2007), 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/unplannedpregnancy/possiblesideeffects.html (last visited Aug. 28, 
2010); WebMD, Women's Health, Abortion-Before, During, and After an Abortion: When to Call a 
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abortion causes an infection, the long-term effects may include chronic pel-
vic inflammations, heightened risk of miscarriage or ectopic pregnancy, and 
infertility.86 In rare cases, abortion is fatal.87 
For many women, an abortion is also hard to obtain. Though Roe v. 
Wade made abortion legal, Roe and its progeny did little to guarantee access 
to abortions,88 and many women still are unable to obtain a speedy, safe, 
and affordable abortion. The overwhelming majority of U.S. counties do 
not have abortion providers. This means that women must travel, some-
times for hours, to the nearest clinic. Once they arrive, an abortion typically 
costs several hundred dollars, and public funding for abortions is limited. 
As a result of their difficulties reaching a clinic and raising the money for 
the procedure, pregnant women who are both poor and young are more like-
ly to undergo later-term-and therefore riskier-abortions.89 
Doctor, http://women.webmd.com/tc/abortion-before-during-and-after-an-abortion-when-to-call-adoctor 
(last visited Aug. 28, 201 0). 
86 See ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & lAN GENTLES, WOMEN'S HEALTH AFTER ABORTION: THE 
MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE (2002). Abortion can lead to many other harmful side ef-
fects. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 247 (22d ed. 2005) ("Although serious compli-
cations of abortion most often occur with criminal abortion, even spontaneous abortion and legal 
elective abortion continue to be associated with severe and even fatal infections. Severe hemorrhage, 
sepsis, bacterial shock, and acute renal failure have all developed in association with abortion but at 
much lower frequency. Uterine infection is the usual outcome, but parametritis, peritonitis, endocarditis, 
and septicemia may all occur." (citations omitted)); Joel Brind et al., Induced Abortion as an Indepen-
dent Risk Factor for Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
& CMTY. HEALTH 481 (1996); David A. Grimes & Mitchell D. Creinin, Induced Abortion: An Overview 
for Internists, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 620 (2004). 
87 One out of 1,000,000 American women dies as a result of having an abortion at or before eight 
weeks. Additionally, "[t]he risk of death associated with abortion increases with the length of pregnan-
cy ... to one per 29,000 at 16-20 weeks-and one per 11,000 at 21 or more weeks." GUTTMACHER 
lNST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb _induced_ abortion.pdf. Earlier studies indicated that the risk of ma-
ternal death from abortion was much higher at all lengths of gestation. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra 
note 86, at 24 7 (relying on studies using data collected before 2004, the authors conclude that "[l]egally 
induced abortion, performed by trained gynecologists, especially when performed during the first 2 
months of pregnancy, has a mortality rate of only 0. 7 per 100,000 procedures. The relative risk of dying 
as the consequence of abortion approximately doubles for each 2 weeks after 8 weeks' gestation"). For 
a more partisan view of the medical risks associated with abortion, see JOHN C. WILLKE & BARBARA H. 
WILLKE, WHY WE CAN'T LoVE THEM BOTH (1997), available at http://www.abortionfacts.com/ 
online_ books/love_ them_ both/why_ cant_ we _love_ them_ both.asp. 
88 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding that states may 
enact restrictions so long as these do not unduly burden women seeking an abortion); Webster v. Re-
prod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (holding that non-life-saving abortions for women pre-
pared to pay full cost may be banned in public facilities); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) 
(upholding a ruling allowing funding for medically necessary abortions to be denied unless the mother's 
life is in danger). 
89 See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 87 ("Eighty-seven percent of all U.S. counties lacked an 
abortion provider in 2005; 35% of women live in those counties. . . . In 2005, the cost of a nonhospital 
abortion with local anesthesia at 10 weeks' gestation ranged from $90 to $1,800; the average amount 
paid was $413 .... Fifty-eight percent of abortion patients say they would have liked to have had their 
abortion earlier. Nearly 60% of women who experienced a delay in obtaining an abortion cite the time it 
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No state requires a man to participate in either the direct or indirect 
costs of abortion. The expense of the procedure itself, the lost income asso-
ciated with undergoing and recovering from it, and the costs of any compli-
cations it may produce fall squarely on the woman. As one feminist put it, 
"[a ]bortion is the last in a long line of non-choices."90 
Setting aside communication issues,91 when lovers are married, weal-
ready recognize that there is no contradiction between a man's obligation 
towards the woman with whom he conceives and her right to choose. 
When husband and wife disagree over abortion, the wife has the final say 
over the decision.92 And if she chooses to continue the pregnancy, she is 
entitled to no less support than had she followed her husband's preference. 
In other words, the law in all fifty states recognizes that a wife's right to 
choose does not cancel her spouse's duty of mutual support. Precisely be-
cause no matter what she chooses it is her body that will bear the conse-
quences, the rough justice that the law effectively strikes in marriage is that 
a wife gets the final say and is entitled to support while her husband gets to 
not be pregnant. A similar logic applies in the nonmarital context. A duty 
of support and reproductive choice are both compatible and fair. 
C. Sex Creates Relationship 
Leaving a pregnant woman to care for herself does make sense in two 
very particular situations. First, men should have no obligations vis-a-vis 
their sexual partners when both parties clearly agree that they have no ex-
pectation of an ongoing relationship. This might happen in the case of an 
explicitly casual, no-strings-attached "hookup." It might also arise where a 
woman wants and intends to have a child alone and conceives with a friend 
took to make arrangements and raise money. Teens are more likely than older women to delay having 
an abortion until after 15 weeks of pregnancy, when the medical risks associated with abortion are sig-
nificantly higher .... Congress has barred the use of federal Medicaid funds to pay for abortions, except 
when the woman's life would be endangered by a full-term pregnancy or in cases of rape or incest. Se-
venteen states use public funds to pay for abortions for some poor women, but only four do so voluntari-
ly; the rest do so under a court order."). 
90 Germaine Greer, The Backlash Myth, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 1992, at 21. Greer continues, 
"(T]he choice to end [a pregnancy] can only be a genuine choice if the pregnant woman has other alter-
natives. If she will lose her lodgings and her job or her educational opportunities if she has a baby, then 
she has no choice at all. If her boyfriend threatens to leave her if she does not accept termination; if her 
parents threaten to make her a ward of court or to disown her ... her right to choose is being ignored." 
!d. at 23. The reproductive choices relevant to this Article relate to pregnancy prevention and termina-
tion. For a discussion of the harms associated with choices made possible by reproductive technologies 
(IVF and surrogacy), see JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTNE TECHNOLOGIES 
AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1995). 
91 See infra Parts II.B. and Ill.B.l.a. 
92 Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (holding unconstitutional 
the Missouri statute requiring spousal consent to an abortion, and noting that "[i]nasmuch as it is the 
woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the 
pregnancy [relative to the man], as between the two, the balance [of the decision whether to abort] 
weighs in her favor"). 
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with the clear understanding that he will bear no responsibilities to help 
support her through the pregnancy. Second, a man should not be required 
to help support a woman with whom he conceives if the woman engaged in 
foul play-for example, lying about birth control. (Currently, victims of 
sexual fraud have limited recourse against a deceiving lover,93 though scho-
lars have argued persuasively for reform in this area.)94 But the one-night-
stand or the case of sexual deception should not define the rule applicable to 
all sexual encounters. 
Much of nonmarital sex happens in the context of good-faith relation-
ships. Of course many people never articulate their expectations should 
they conceive accidentally. Surprisingly, although there is a vast body of 
literature on expectations surrounding what constitutes consent to sexual 
contact, none of the sources I have reviewed deal with consensual lovers' 
ex ante expectations vis-a-vis each other regarding the unintended conse-
quences of their activity. (A small number of studies suggest that once 
pregnancy occurs, unmarried male partners remain at least partially in-
volved.)95 In light of the fact that most pregnancies result not from birth 
93 Stephen K. v Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("(A]Ithough Roni may have 
lied and betrayed the personal confidence reposed in her by Stephen, the circumstances and the highly 
intimate nature of the relationship wherein the false representations may have occurred, are such that a 
court should not define any standard of conduct therefor."); C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556,556 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (affirming the lower court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a father 
who had misrepresented a vasectomy prior to consensual intercourse); Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (App. Div. 1985) (dismissing an action by a man claiming he was defrauded by a 
woman who removed an intrauterine contraceptive device without informing him). But see Barbara A. 
v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422,431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding a battery damages award to a wom-
an whose reliance on a man's fraudulent misrepresentation of sterility resulted in an ectopic pregnancy 
which ended in miscarriage and surgery rendering her sterile); Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 
350, 356-57 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (allowing a woman to recover damages against a former partner for 
the costs of an abortion, loss of earning potential, and pain and suffering based on negligent misrepre-
sentation). 
94 Chamallas, supra note 9; I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1115, 1158 (2008); Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father's Right to Pursue a 
Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1065-92 (2005); Larson, supra note 
9, at 380. Larson argues that "physical and emotional injuries caused by deceptive inducement into sex" 
should be compensable through a "sexual fraud" tort, a revitalized, modernized, feminist variation on 
the common law tort of seduction. Larson's proposal is limited to "intentional, harmful misrepresenta-
tion made for the purpose of gaining another's consent to sexual relations." /d. Paula C. Murray & 
Brenda J. Winslett, The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Emerging Tort Liability for Deceit in Inter-
personal Relationships, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 779, 780 (arguing that where a woman intentionally dece-
ives her partner into impregnating her, public policy considerations regarding the child's interest should 
not absolve the woman of all liability towards the father); Oberman, supra note 9; VanderVelde, supra 
note 9 (arguing with regards to all harmful forms of "sexual connection," including sexual fraud); Jo-
shua Kleinfeld, Comment, Tort Law and In Vitro Fertilization: The Need for Legal Recognition of 
"Procreative Injury," 115 YALE L.J. 237,239-40 (2005); Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner's 
Tort Liability to Other Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth 
Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301 (1992). 
95 One study of unmarried parents in Oakland, California, revealed that most unmarried parents 
were romantically involved when their child was born and that about half were living together. SARAH 
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control failures but from repeated acts of unprotected intercourse,96 it is hard 
to believe that more women get pregnant from anonymous one-night-stands 
than from sex with a steady partner. Thus, it is safe to say that many 
people's baseline expectations, while diverse, are significantly higher than 
our default lovers-as-strangers rule, including when it comes to the costs of 
abortion.97 
But even if the current rule were shown to match widespread expecta-
tions, it is inappropriate as a normative matter. When heterosexual partners 
have sex for pleasure and pregnancy ensues, it is only fair that both parties 
take responsibility for the consequences. This is especially true when a gap 
in the parties' expectations corresponds to power imbalances within the 
couple.98 
There are also utilitarian reasons for allocating the price of pleasure 
more equitably. This is not to say that the current rule turns all men into 
cads. Good guys don't need external incentives to do the right thing; they 
MCLANAHAN ET AL., PuB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., FRAGILE FAMILIES ONE YEAR LATER: OAKLAND, 
CALIFORNIA 7 (2003), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/op_l002smop.pdf. Approx-
imately 80 percent of the mothers in the survey "reported that the father had contributed financial sup-
port or helped in other ways (such as providing transportation) during the pregnancy." Id. at 10; see also 
MAUREEN R. WALLER, MY BABY'S FATHER: UNMARRIED PARENTS AND PATERNAL RESPONSIBILITY 2-
3 (2002) ("Approximately 33 percent of all births in the United States now occur to umnarried par-
ents ... [and] about half of these parents are living together at the time of their child's birth." (citation 
omitted)). 
96 See DARROCH ET AL., supra note 82, at I ("Slightly more than half of unintended pregnancies oc-
cur among women who were not using any method of contraception in the month they conceived, and 
more than four in I 0 occur among women who used their method inconsistently or incorrectly. Only 
one in 20 are attributable to method failure."); MCDONAGH, supra note 26, at 52-53 ("The reason wom-
en become pregnant, therefore, is not because a high probability of pregnancy is associated with any 
single incident of unprotected sexual intercourse, or even with a month of unprotected sex. Rather, it is 
because couples engage in multiple acts of sexual intercourse, thereby increasing a woman's exposure to 
the risk of pregnancy."). 
97 Surveys of men in abortion clinic waiting rooms reveal that most men pay for some or all of the 
procedure. The studies make no mention of additional costs like lost wages. See, e.g., ARTHUR B. 
SHOSTAK, GARY MCLOUTH & LYNN SENG, MEN AND ABORTION: LESSONS, LOSSES, AND LoVE 36 
(1984); Jennifer A. Reich & Claire D Brindis, Conceiving Risk and Responsibility: A Qualitative Ex-
amination of Men's Experiences of Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion, 5 INT'L J. MEN'S HEALTH 133, 
145 (2006). Note, however, that data on how many men accompany their partner to the clinic are incon-
sistent. Compare Reich & Brindis, supra, at 135 ("One recent study found that only 22-25% of women 
came or left the abortion procedure with the man by whom they became pregnant." (citation omitted)), 
with Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of Paternal Bonding in the Law of Fam-
ily Relations, 33 IND. L. REv. 691, 711 n.lll (2000) (finding that men accompanied their partners to 
abortion clinics approximately half of the time (citation omitted)). 
98 Such imbalances may often be gendered in nature. Hirshman and Larson argue that "[i]n hetero-
sexual exchanges, the male and female sexual players start from a baseline of physical inequality of 
strength, size and vulnerability to pregnancy." HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 10, at 22. According-
ly, a just sex code should "establish baselines that moderate the downward spiral of unequal bargaining" 
by "shifting the burden of silence onto the stronger player." Jd. at 2, 283. But even where the imbalance 
does not fall along gendered lines, the same principle holds: the baseline should protect the weaker party 
to the "sexual bargain." !d. at 267-{)8. 
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do their best to prevent pregnancy and when their efforts fail, they don't 
leave their partner in the lurch, even when their legal duties are minimal or 
nil. But for some men, the bottom line matters. 
Studies show, for example, that adolescent men who expect to pay 
child support should their partner become pregnant have fewer partners, 
less frequent intercourse, and are more likely to use contraceptives.99 But in 
some relationships men assume-sometimes reasonably-that a woman 
will terminate an unwanted pregnancy. How does the fact that abortion 
frees men not only of child support but also of any responsibility towards 
the woman figure into what happens in the bedroom? 
Decisions about sex, contraception, and abortion take place in the sha-
dow of the law's allocation of their attendant risks. It's only logical that 
one way to reduce unintended pregnancies might be to raise the stakes for 
men, to make sure all pregnancies have concrete consequences for both par-
ties involved. Thus, increasing support for pregnant women regardless of 
the pregnancy's outcome will, over time, change abortion from a form of 
birth control that lets men off the hook into something both parties are in-
vested in preventing. It may also reduce abortions obtained under the pres-
sure of short-term economic considerations. 100 
This Article does not suggest that conception should trigger a type of 
common-law marriage with robust long-term commitments. Rather, as ex-
plained further in Part III, when unmarried lovers conceive, the law should 
recognize their relationship as something that falls in between that of com-
plete strangers and that of spouses, 101 unless they agree otherwise. A lovers-
as-strangers rule is not inherently wrong; it is simply the wrong default. 
99 See Chien-Chung Huang & Wen-Jui Han, Child Suppon Enforcement and Sexual Activity of 
Male Adolescents, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 763, 772 (2007) [hereinafter Huang & Han, Child Sup-
pon Enforcement]; see also Chien-Chung Huang & Wen-Jui Han, Perceptions of Child Support and 
Sexual Activity of Adolescent Males, 27 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 731 (2004) (discussing empirical studies 
relating to teen sexual activity, use of contraceptives, and pregnancy). 
100 A recent study suggests that child support enforcement decreases the incidence of abortion. Jo-
celyn Crowley, Radha Jagannathan, & Galo Falchettore, The Effect of Child Support Enforcement on 
Nonmarital Births and Abortion in the United States (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For 
data on the higher incidence of abortion among poor women, see RACHEL K. JONES, LAWRENCE B. 
FINER & SUSHEELA SINGH, GUTIMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS, 2008, 
at I, 9 (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs!US-Abortion-Patients.pdf ("Poor women 
were overrepresented among abortion patients. Their relative abortion rate was more than twice that of 
all women in 2008 ... and more than five times that of women at 200% or more of the poverty lev-
el .... "); Annie Murphy Paul, Is the Recession Causing More Abortions?, SLATE, May 15, 2009, 
http://www.doublex.com/section!health-sciencelrecession-causing-more-abortions?page=O,O (arguing 
that "fmancial hardship has been an ever-present motivation for ending a pregnancy"). 
101 For a broader argument that family law should recognize and support friendships that do not re-
semble marriage or marriage-like relationship, see Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
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II. RECONCEIVING CONCEPTION 
Before turning to alternatives to the current rule, a deeper look at its 
conceptual underpinnings may help us identify not only the symptoms but 
also the roots of the problem. This Part suggests that the "lovers-as-
strangers" rule stems from a jurisprudential orientation that views human 
beings as definitionally separate and distinct from one another. This bias 
casts us as free-floating individuals whose primary concern is maximizing 
privacy and autonomy. But human beings are also essentially connected to 
others. In disregarding our dual nature and privileging separation over con-
nection, the law's approach to pregnancy misses something fundamental, 
causing both men and women to suffer. 
After introducing this framework, this Part illustrates its effects on 
another aspect of the current law of conception: communication between 
sexual partners. The corollary of the no-strings-attached default governing 
men's responsibility vis-a-vis the consequences of pregnancy is a rule that 
places virtually no obligation on women to communicate with their partners 
about conception, abortion, or childbirth. 
The fmal section of this Part uses norms developed by practitioners of 
controlled sadomasochism as a foil to expose the questionable assumptions 
inherent in the status quo. Whereas some S/M subcultures insist that part-
ners who engage in activities that involve asymmetrical risks explicitly con-
sent and agree on who bears responsibility for their potential harmful 
consequences, mainstream heterosexual norms assume an each-one-for-
oneselfbaseline unless the parties are married. In other words, S/M's codes 
assume a relational default while our mainstream sex code assumes that 
lovers are strangers. As a result, the current paradigm throws vulnerable 
women into a game that is ethically murkier than formal SIM-a game that 
involves asymmetrical risks and a no-liability default that springs to life 
without any explicit show of consent. 
A. Human Beings' Dual Nature: Connected and Separate 
The current lovers-as-strangers paradigm exemplifies what Robin West 
sees as the hyper-individualistic starting point-the "separation thesis"-
that underlies modem American jurisprudence. 102 This starting point, she 
argues, corresponds with a philosophical worldview that places autonomy 
as its supreme value.103 Under this view, man is born alone and he dies 
alone. His most powerful craving is to be left alone. 
102 See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988). A related theory 
has been advanced by Linda Hirshman and Jane Larson, who employ the term "libertinism" to describe 
the individualistic sexual ideology that has dominated sexual politics since the 1960s. See HIRSHMAN & 
LARSON, supra note 10, at 10, 211. 
103 
"[W]hat separates us," West quotes Michael Sandel as saying, "is in some important sense prior 
to what connects us .... We are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and engage in 
co-operative arrangements with others." West, supra note 102, at 2. Thus, under the "separation the-
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West believes that the "separation thesis" is "essentially and irretrieva-
bly masculine."104 Women, unlike men, "are not essentially, necessarily, 
inevitably ... separate from other human beings .... [Women] are 'essen-
tially connected. "'105 West locates women's essential connectedness in their 
"critical material experiences," including pregnancy and breastfeeding.106 
Women value or define themselves in terms of connection, intimacy, and 
relationship. Their well-being can only be advanced through a system that 
recognizes this essential aspect of their existential reality. A jurisprudence 
that places autonomy as its supreme value will by definition leave women 
out in the cold. 107 
But West believes that men also value connectedness. Referencing 
critical legal theorists, she explains that men are also harmed by the separa-
tion bias of dominant legal categories, albeit in different ways. Whereas 
women are naturally and constitutionally connected to others, men crave 
connection because their original state (as liberal legal theory proclaims) is 
one of separateness. According to West, liberal theory is wrong when it as-
sumes that men's primary aim is to preserve this separateness through guar-
sis," "the inevitability of the individual's material separation from the 'other,' entails, first and foremost, 
an existential state of ... freedom: because the individual is separate from the other, he is free of the 
other." ld at 5. 
104 Jd. at 2; see also HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that the individualist pers-
pective of "libertine sexual deregulation" in the 1960s "turned women into men, sexually female, but 
with all the other characteristics of men: strength, independence, emotional control and separation from 
the consequences of reproduction"). 
105 West, supra note 102, at 2-3. 
106 See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of 
Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 210 (2000) ("The experience of being human, for 
women, differentially from men, includes the counter-autonomous experience of a shared physical iden-
tity between woman and fetus, as well as the counter-autonomous experience of the emotional and psy-
chological bond between mother and infant. Our reproductive role renders us non-autonomous in a 
second, less obvious, but ultimately more far-reaching sense. Emotionally and morally women may 
benefit from the dependency of the fetus and the infant upon us. But materially we are more often bur-
dened than enriched by that dependency. And because we are burdened, we differentially depend more 
heavily upon others, both for our own survival, and for the survival of the children who are part of us. 
Women, more than men, depend upon relationships with others, because the weakest of human beings-
infants-depend upon us. Thus, motherhood leaves us vulnerable: a woman giving birth is unable to 
defend herself against aggression; a woman nursing an infant is physically exposed; a woman nurturing 
and feeding the young is less able to feed herself. Motherhood leaves us unequal. ... To the considera-
ble degree that our potentiality for motherhood defines ourselves, women's lives are relational, not auto-
nomous."). 
107 West believes that both liberal and radical feminists have mistakenly adopted autonomy as their 
ultimate goal without asking whether it correlates with women's experiences, desires, or capacity for 
happiness. She views liberal feminists' commitment to increasing women's choices and radical femin-
ists' commitment to increasing women's power as both essentially assimilationist; they "share a vision 
of human being, and therefore of our subjective well-being, as 'autonomous"' rather than connected or 
"relational." !d. at 209-10. 
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antees of autonomy. Rather, men yearn to overcome their essential aliena-
tion and isolation through relationship.108 
I do not know whether separation is essentially masculine or connec-
tion is essentially feminine, but I do believe that the ultimate conclusion 
West draws from these categories is crucial to the knot we are trying to un-
ravel. Her most compelling insight is that connectedness expresses an im-
portant, undervalued truth that is critical to the happiness of both men and 
women. Though she emphasizes the differences between the sexes, West 
also thinks that both men and women are animated by both connection and 
separation. It is the tension between the two, she says, that is essential to 
our nature. 109 
Applying West's insight to unintended pregnancy, the notion that hu-
man nature is centrally defined by the tension between separation and con-
nection reveals the core problem undergirding the current rule. True, only 
women get pregnant, only women are capable of containing another life. 
But both men and women begin, at conception, in ultimate connection, con-
tained in the body of another. Both are born in radical separation, separa-
tion rife with pain. And both go through life negotiating this contradiction, 
this duality--our connection to and our separation from the woman and the 
man who gave us life, our connection to and our separation from the lovers 
with whom we each play out our original script. Sometimes the Rule of 
Law embodies this essential contradiction, 110 our internal tug-of-war be-
tween connection and separation. But often, and certainly in the case of 
conception, the law is biased in favor of separation. 
In short, treating lovers who have conceived as strangers is wrong be-
cause treating all human beings as strangers is wrong. Pregnancy and the 
intercourse that brings it about are the ultimate embodiment of our essential 
108 See West, supra note 102, at 9-12; see also ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: 
UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 56 (1997) ("Patriarchy is grounded in a Great Lie that the an-
swer to life's needs is disconnection, competition, and control rather than connection, sharing, and coop-
eration. The Great Lie separates men from what they need most by encouraging them to be autonomous 
and disconnected when in fact human existence is fundamentally relational. What is a 'me' without a 
'you,' a 'mother' without a 'child,' a 'teacher' without a 'student'? Who are we if not our ties to other 
people---'1 am . .. a father, a husband, a worker, a friend, a son, a brother'? But patriarchal culture turns 
the truth inside out and 'self-made-man' goes from oxymoron to cultural ideal." (ellipsis in original)). 
109 See West, supra note 102, at 50-58 (referencing the position of critical legal theorists Roberto 
Unger and Duncan Kennedy that the essential human condition is defmed by a fundamental contradic-
tion between connection and separation); see also id. at 70-71. West argues that the separation thesis is 
drastically untrue of women and not entirely true of men either: "First, it is not true materially. Men are 
connected to another human life prior to the cutting of the umbilical cord. Furthermore, men are some-
what connected to women during intercourse .... Nor is the separation thesis necessarily true of men 
existentially. . . . [M]en can connect to other human life. Men can nurture life. Men can mother. Ob-
viously, men can care, and love, and support, and affirm life. . . . On the flip side, the 'connection the-
sis' is also not entirely true of women, either materially or existentially. Not all women become 
pregnant, and not all women are sexually penetrated. Women can go through life unconnected to other 
human life. Women can also go through life fundamentally unconcerned with other human life." !d. 
110 /d. at 52. 
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connectedness, of our vulnerability at the hands of another, of our lack of 
control in relationship. What do men and women want when we conceive? 
The law assumes that the most important things we want are autonomy, 
equality, and privacy. We value all of these, but as importantly, many of us 
also want not to be left alone. 111 
B. Separation and Secrecy 
So far we have focused on the current rule's allocation of the material 
costs of pregnancy. The relational critique sheds light on another troubling 
aspect of the status quo: the almost nonexistent communication duties that it 
places on sexual partners. The same individual-centered orientation that 
leaves a woman to deal with an unwanted pregnancy alone and puts minim-
al responsibilities on the man also gives him minimal entitlements. A 
woman may decide to undergo or forgo an abortion irrespective of her lov-
er's preferences, 112 and with no obligation to communicate with him regard-
less of the nature of their relationship, including if they are married. 113 Not 
only may a woman keep her decision to abort secret, she may conceive, car-
ry a pregnancy to term, and raise a man's child without ever informing 
him. 114 If she does inform him, she may receive retroactive child support 
111 Of course, not everybody wants the same thing. Critics of relational feminism have made this 
clear. See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 
58-76 (2006) (critiquing West's cultural feminism as a form of feminist supremacy). Some women 
want to be left alone just as some men want to have sex and never hear from the woman again, even if 
she bears their child. Some lovers are indeed strangers. But that does not mean that their background 
assumptions should govern all. The fact that they do puts tremendous pressure on people whose sensi-
bilities run contrary, producing dynamics that can leave both sexes feeling abused and embattled. 
112 See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abortion and Birth Control§ 25 (2009). 
113 See Plaffi!ed Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992); Cecily L. Helms & 
Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers: An Unwed Mother's Right to Privacy in Adoptions, 20 
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 20 (2005) (discussing statutes that consider a man who engages in non-marital 
sex to be on notice of a possible pregnancy); Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Parent's Child Support Lia-
bility as Affected by Other Parent's Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility of Use of Birth 
Control, or Refosal to Abort Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.Sth 337, § 2(a) (1992) "[A] mother's ... right to priva-
cy encompasses her decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, and therefore no state may interfere 
with or regulate the decision to terminate in the first trimester absent a compelling interest outweighing 
that right. To date, the courts have refused to deem a woman's decision to bear a child despite the ob-
jections of the child's father, even where he has offered to pay for an abortion, to create an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the father's federal or state equal protection or due process rights." (citations 
omitted)). But see Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women's Sexuality, 56 
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1245 (2007) (discussing fathers' rights advocates' recent calls for a "fmancial abor-
tion" option, which would free men of the obligation to pay child support where the woman carrying his 
fetus refuses to abort the pregnancy); John Tierney, Op-Ed., Men's Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
10,2006, at A25. 
114 For a discussion of women's limited obligations to notifY their partners of a pregnancy, see 
Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1031, 
1061 (2002) ("State cases have held that notice is not required to unwed fathers who have not estab-
lished a relationship with the child nor filed with a putative father registry, without regard for the length 
of time permitted by the deadline . . . . Courts have also upheld the constitutionality of the termination 
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reimbursements for years during which the father did not know that he had 
a child.115 The only scenario in which the women may be required to give 
notice is if she wishes to begin an adoption proceeding. 116 In general, how-
ever, a man has no legally enforceable right to be informed regarding his 
sexual partner's conception, pregnancy, or childbirth.117 
This rule seems reasonable insofar as it protects a woman's privacy, 
autonomy, and safety. But from a relational perspective, it comes at a price. 
of rights when there is a failure to register regardless of the mother's identification and notification of 
the father."). 
115 The statute of limitations for retroactive child support can be as long as eighteen years from the 
birth of the child. State ex ref. Reitenour, 807 A.2d 1259, 1262 (N.H. 2002) ("[O]nce paternity has 
been established, the father of a child born out of wedlock may be liable for past expenses associated 
with the mother's pregnancy and confmement. . . . Additionally, the applicable statute of limitations 
permits proceedings to be brought within eighteen years of the date of birth of the child in question."). 
In New Hampshire, the only limitation on the mother's ability to collect is the statute oflimitations. See 
id. Maine, by contrast, limits a father's liability to the six-year period preceding the commencement of 
an action brought within the status oflimitations. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1554 (1998). 
116 See VNIF. ADOPTION ACT§ 3-404,9 U.L.A. 11 (1994); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 403 (amended 
2002), 10 U.L.A. 321; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,263-64 (1983) (holding that an unwed 
father's right to be notified of adoption proceedings was contingent upon his filing with the state's puta-
tive father registry). Note that indigent mothers applying for public assistance may also be forced to re-
veal the identity of their child's father as a condition for receiving benefits, but these requirements are 
grounded on the state's interest in minimizing its own liability rather than on fathers' right to know. See 
Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 989, 1070 (1995). 
117 An additional communication-related manifestation of the separation thesis concerns the rules 
governing sexual fraud. As we have seen, victims of sexual fraud have limited recourse against their 
deceivers. The rationales behind rulings in this area focus on privacy, evidentiary challenges, reluctance 
to brand a child as "damage," and maintenance of child support obligations. As one opinion put it, ab-
solving a father from the obligation to support his child would "create a new and inferior category of 
out-of-wedlock child based upon the circumstances of conception and would subordinate the constitu-
tional rights and other interests of the child to those of one of the parents." Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 
N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982); see also Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405--06 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987) (noting that concern over the child elicits a different public policy consideration than a 
cause of action to recover damages for severe injury resulting from misrepresentations and is not insu-
lated from judicial scrutiny). Thus, child support statutes typically peg the amount of support owed to 
the child's needs and welfare and to the parents' financial capabilities, "without reference to the fault of 
either parent in causing conception of the child." Payne, supra note 113, at§ 7(a). 
Even when an action is brought subsequent to a child support determination and is clearly presented 
as a claim for personal recovery by one parent against the other, courts tend to interpret the claim as cen-
trally about the child. See C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); 
Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 887, 888 (Wash. App. 1989), review denied, 779 P.2d 730 (Wash. 1989). 
Since the child was innocent of the fraud and, courts believe, is likely to suffer should one parent be 
permitted to recover from the other, they often bar such claims. 
But focusing on the child ignores a critical relational dimension of the situation. Sex is not typically 
like an arms-length commercial transaction: it often takes place in the context of a relationship in which 
people want and expect honesty. And yet, the standards governing sexual relations fall far short of those 
governing the most impersonal of transactions. As one commentator put it, intimate relationships are 
governed by a caveat emptor rule, a "norm of nondisclosure [that] represents a degree of complacency 
with regard to bald-faced lying that is almost unparalleled in the common law governing tort and con-
tract." Oberman, supra note 9, at 889. 
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This price is obliquely acknowledged in jurisprudence on the interests of 
men whose sexual partners decide independently to undergo an abortion. 
Reading two such cases through the lens of separation versus connection is 
instructive. 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth concerns whether 
husbands may veto their wives' reproductive choices, 118 and Planned Pa-
renthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey concerns whether hus-
bands are entitled to be notified prior to an abortion (among other issues). 119 
Both cases reject the control and informational interests of husbands and in-
stead protect the woman's individual reproductive rights, but Danforth goes 
further towards acknowledging the relational tensions at play, the challenge 
inherent when we recognize both separate and connected aspects of human 
nature. Both cases deal with married couples, but their holdings apply to 
unmarried couples as well-if the relational interests that flow from mar-
riage are not enough to overcome a woman's individual right to choose and 
to hide pregnancy, extramarital relations command even less respect. 
Danforth holds that a husband may not veto his wife's decision toter-
minate a pregnancy. The opinion does, however, acknowledge the tension 
between its "separation" -privileging result and the imperatives of "connec-
tion" by recognizing "the deep and proper concern and interest that a de-
voted and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth 
and development of the fetus she is carrying."120 As the Court explains, 
[I]deally the decision to terminate a pregnancy should be one concurred in by 
both the wife and her husband. No marriage may be viewed as harmonious or 
successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on so important 
and vital an issue. But it is difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mu-
tuality and trust in a marriage ... will be achieved by giving the husband a ve-
to power. . . . [W]hen the wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the 
view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is 
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and 
118 Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (invalidating consent 
provisions of a Missouri statute, including requiring blanket parental consent as a condition for an un-
married minor's abortion during the first trimester based on insufficient state interest but upholding the 
constitutionality of the statute's reporting and recordkeeping requirements). 
119 Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (invalidating part of a Penn-
sylvania statue that required a married woman to provide, among other things, the reason for failure to 
provide notice of an abortion to her husband as an unconstitutional deviation from the standards estab-
lished for such reporting provisions under Danforth). 
120 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69. The Court reasoned that "the marital couple is not an independent ent-
ity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellec-
tual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." !d. at 70 n.l1 (quoting Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance 
weighs in her favor. 121 
Danforth thus implicitly recognizes the competing pulls of connection 
and separation. Pregnancy affects both parties to a relationship. Ideally 
therefore, decisions about it should be made collectively. It is only when 
consensus cannot be reached that the decisionmaking balance must neces-
sarily tip in favor of one of the two individuals. Danforth favors the wife, 
but it recognizes that pregnancy implicates husbands' interests as well. A 
husband who becomes a father against his will or is powerless to prevent 
the abortion he opposes may suffer deep, long-term, fmancial, psychologi-
cal, and spiritual harms. A wife has the final say not because the husband 
has no say but because he has marginally less say, due to the fact that he is 
not the one who "physically bears the child. "122 
This tripartite balancing ofthe lovers' interests as a couple, the man's 
interests as potential father, and the woman's interests as potential mother 
and carrier of the fetus is less prominent in the Court's reasoning in Casey. 
Casey struck down a state statute requiring a married woman seeking an 
abortion to notify her husband in advance. 123 I believe the outcome of Ca-
sey is correct: doctors who perform abortions should not be required to 
withhold their services from women who have not signed an affidavit indi-
cating that they have notified their husbands. But the reasoning, while 
briefly recognizing the relational interests discussed in Danforth,124 is over-
whelmingly weighted toward separation. 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion focuses on evidence showing that 
a significant number of women do not notify their husbands of their deci-
sion to obtain an abortion in order to protect their own and their children's 
safety.125 Though the statute at issue in the case exempted women who be-
lieved that notification would expose them to bodily injury, the exception 
was too narrow because it did not account for emotional harm or harm to 
children.126 Also, by requiring the woman to sign an affidavit implicating 
her husband, the statute was blind to the dangers that victims of domestic 
121 Jd.at71. 
122 Jd. 
123 Casey, 505 U.S. at 901. 
124 !d. at 895 ("We recognize that a husband has a 'deep and proper concern and interest ... in his 
wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying." (citing Danforth, 428 
U.S. at 69)). 
125 !d. at 877-79. 
126 The District Court found that 
[t]he 'bodily injury' exception could not be invoked by a married woman whose husband, if noti-
fied, would, in her reasonable belief, threaten to ... retaliate against her in future child custody or 
divorce proceedings; ... inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, her child-
ren or other persons; ... inflict bodily harm on other persons such as children, family members or 
other loved ones; or ... use his control over fmances to deprive of necessary monies for herself or 
her children. 
!d. at 888. 
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violence face when they report their abusers. 127 Thus, O'Connor concludes 
that "[ f]or the great many women who are victims of abuse inflicted by 
their husbands, ... a spousal notice requirement enables the husband to 
wield an effective veto over his wife's decision."128 Therefore, "the notice 
requirement will often be tantamount to the veto found unconstitutional in 
Danforth. "129 
The threat of violence doubtless justifies a woman's secrecy, and Jus-
tice O'Connor does a great service by turning the Court's spotlight on the 
unacceptably high incidence of domestic abuse and its impact on pregnant 
women. But women who hide their pregnancies from the men with whom 
they conceive do so for a range of reasons. Many, as Casey reports, are vic-
tims of abuse. Others may hide for different reasons: because they don't 
care for the man; because they want to avoid the intimacy that the conversa-
tion will create; because they are involved with another man; because they 
do not want to be swayed towards or away from abortion; because they are 
afraid of being abandoned; because they don't want to ask for empathy or 
help when they suspect none will be given; because they feel guilty, 
ashamed, responsible. Not all of these reasons justify the harm that secrecy 
inflicts on men and on the relationship. Casey missed an opportunity to 
make clear that when revealing her pregnancy would not endanger a wom-
an, hiding it from the man is often wrong because pregnancy has relational 
implications. 130 It may not be practically possible to craft a law that ex-
empts only women with good reasons for hiding their pregnancies from no-
tifying their partners, but acknowledging the rough justice that the current 
rule strikes would have expressive value. 
Again, some men may prefer a no-strings-attached arrangement, but 
others approach sex with different baseline expectations. Many men would 
like and actively demonstrate their desire to know of the fact of concep-
127 See id. at 893 ("[T]here are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular 
physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become pregnant, 
they may ... have justifiable fears of physical abuse, but may be no less fearful of the consequences of 
reporting prior abuse to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania .... [Accordingly,] many women who are 
pregnant as a result of sexual assaults by their husbands will be unable to avail themselves of the excep-
tion for spousal sexual assault ... because the exception requires that the woman have notified law en-
forcement authorities within 90 days of the assault, and her husband will be notified of her report once 
an investigation begins. If anything in this field is certain, it is that victims of spousal sexual assault are 
extremely reluctant to report the abuse to the govermnent; hence, a great many spousal rape victims will 
not be exempt from the notification requirement." (citations omitted)). 
128 !d. at 897. 
129 !d. 
130 The final holding of the case is correct because healthcare providers at abortion clinics should 
not be tasked with enforcing communication obligations between lovers that should arise-as I discuss 
further in Part ill-when a woman learns of the fact of conception, not when she prepares to terminate a 
pregnancy. The clinics' job is to treat women according to their individual decisions. 
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tion. 131 They are willing and ready to help support the woman through 
whatever decision she makes, but they also want an opportunity to share 
their feelings about the pregnancy. When partners' wishes regarding abor-
tion are diametrically opposed, the woman should have the final say: it is in 
the end her body that will bear the consequences, and even in marriage the 
wife's final preference rules. But guaranteeing this right to women may not 
require shutting all men out of the process entirely. 
C. Sadomasochism as Mirror 
The relational critique also reveals that the default rules governing 
mainstream heterosexual intercourse are surprisingly similar to the rules 
adopted by some practitioners of formal sadomasochism, except that "vanil-
la" couples tend to accept these rules far less consciously and deliberately. 
Nonprocreative sex is inherently risky; consenting to it therefore involves a 
sacrifice of sorts. Women sacrifice their bodies by popping hormones or 
risking pregnancy and men sacrifice control over their potential offspring. 
In this sense, sex can be seen as (among other things) a sacrifice ritual, a 
dramatic dance in which both actors find ecstasy through their respective 
roles-victim and victimizer, sacrificed and one for whom a sacrifice is 
made. Men and women each play both roles in different ways. In this ex-
change of power and vulnerability, "free love" resembles sadomasochism 
minus two critical components: consensual assumption of unequal risk and 
explicit agreement about its potential consequences. 
Theorist and self-described sadist Pat Califia explains the elaborate 
lengths to which practitioners go to make their consent explicit: 
An S/M scene is always preceded by a negotiation in which the top and bottom 
decide whether or not they will play, what activities are likely to occur, what 
activities will not occur, and about how long the scene will last. The bottom is 
usually given a safe word or code action she can use to stop the scene. This 
safe word allows the bottom to fantasize that the scene is not consensual and to 
protest verbally or resist physically without halting stimulation.132 
131 See Reich & Brindis, supra note 97, at 135 (noting "men articulate the importance of responsi-
bility and may internalize expectations to behave responsibly"). Of the twenty men interviewed, three 
learned about their partners' pregnancies and abortions after they occurred. !d. at 142. These men "said 
that they would not have done anything to dissuade the woman from having an abortion, but they wished 
they could have been involved." !d. As one subject put it, "I felt saddened later that she never told me. 
She never let me in on the process of decision [making]. . . . I think if two people are involved, then two 
people should b'.) involved in the process. When it comes down to the nitty gritty, I don't think any man 
could force a woman to have a child, but I think that it should really be talked about and should really be 
discussed from all angles .... I felt that then and I feel it now." !d. at 142-43 {alterations in original). 
132 PAT CALIFIA, Feminism and Sadomasochism, in PuBLIC SEX: THE CULTURE OF RADICAL 165, 
168 (1994); see also Lesley Hall, Pain and the Erotic, PAIN, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/enlpainl 
microsite/culturel.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) ("[S]ubcultures of individuals interested in consen-
sual sadomasochistic practices ... [have] developed codes of conduct to ensure the safety of partici-
pants, embodied in the rubric 'Safe, Sane and Consensual.' ... Far from the masochist, or 'bottom', 
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Because of its consensual nature, Califia stresses that "sadomasochism 
is not a form of sexual assault. "133 Califia also seeks to dispel the wide-
spread view that sadomasochism is essentially violent, explaining that 
"[s]afety is a major concern for sadomasochists."134 "The key word to un-
derstanding S/M is fantasy. The roles, dialogue, fetish costumes, and sex-
ual activity are part of a drama or ritual. The participants are enhancing 
their sexual pleasure, not damaging or imprisoning each other.'m5 Accord-
ing to Califia, it is the role play of domination and submission that is criti-
cal: "[t]he exchange of power is more essential to S/M than intense 
sensation."136 
Nevertheless, S/M safety codes do not necessarily mean nobody gets 
hurt. 137 Rather, they mean that dangers are acknowledged and knowingly 
assumed. S/M practitioners sometimes formalize and record the "rules" of 
their game in a contract which bears an uncanny resemblance to the default 
rule that currently governs unmarried lovers who have conceived. One such 
contract, for example, includes the following language: 
I understand that ... sadomasochistic activities involve certain real and unpre-
dictable risks that cannot be eliminated regardless of the care taken to avoid in-
juries. . . . I fully assume the risks and dangers as acceptable to me . . . I 
understand and agree that any bodily injury, death, or loss of personal property 
and expenses as a result of my own intentional or negligent act(s), or the inten-
tional or negligent act(s) of any other person(s) participating in any ... activi-
ty, or as a result of the failure or malfunction of any piece(s) of equipment or 
devices, is my responsibility and I accept same. 138 
This type of contract recognizes that intimacy involving inherently un-
equal risks demands explicit discussion regarding the allocation of potential 
consequences. The implicit assumption at work is that absent the agree-
ment, parties would be responsible towards each other. In other words, 
waivers of this type presume a relational default, placing the burden to opt-
out on that those who prefer a no-strings-attached rule. Not all S/M practi-
being at the mercy of the sadist, or 'top', it was widely claimed that the bottom controlled the scene by 
defining its limits; while the top was not indulging in a frenzy of violence, but consciously and attentive-
ly deploying certain practices, some of them demanding considerable skill and dexterity."). 
133 CALIFIA, supra note 132, at 167-72. 
134 Jd at 168. 
135 Id 
136 Califia writes that "S/M does not necessarily involve pain" but also acknowledges that "pain is a 
subjective experience." /d. at 170. 
137 See id. ("Depending on the context, a certain sensation may frighten you, make you angry, urge 
you on, or get you hot. In many situations, people choose to endure pain or discomfort if the goal for 
which they are striving makes it worthwhile. Long-distance runners are not generally thought of as per-
verts, nor is Mother Theresa."). 
138 NEST Rules, http://nestgatherings.com!Default.aspx?CatiD=II9&CatName=NEST"/o20Rules% 
20&%20Waiver (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
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tioners use contracts or discuss liability vis-a-vis risks, but those who do 
provide a useful example of what is possible. 
Our current rule throws lovers who have conceived into territory that is 
ethically murkier than this brand of controlled, deliberate S/M-which 
some courts have found illegal despite its consensual nature139-in that it 
assumes that both parties have agreed to terms along these no-liability lines. 
In this sense, the clearly negotiated structure of the S/M exchange, and in 
particular the masochist's (the "bottom's") ultimate control over the para-
meters of permitted activity and his or her ability to stop it at any point, 
may make S/M safer than "vanilla" sex, in which misunderstandings about 
desire, consent, pain, and pleasure abound. The S/M practitioner signing 
the above waiver vows that he or she "understand[ s] that accidents may oc-
cur, mistakes may be made, equipment and devices may fail or malfunc-
tion."140 Clear-eyed conventional couples have similarly tenuous faith in 
condoms and diaphragms, but unlike practitioners of controlled S/M, they 
are governed by a no-liability standard by default rather than by choice. 
To sum up, sexual partners who conceive are not strangers. We are all 
connected. In sex we enact the most radical manifestation of our intercon-
nectedness. Sex is connection, a connection that is sometimes also a con-
ception. How might the law handle the results with greater care? 
III. TOWARDS A NEW LAW OF CONCEPTION 
By treating sexual partners who conceive as legal strangers, the law 
reinforces rather than mitigates the vulnerabilities of both men and women. 
The law does, however, provide an alternative form for couples who want 
the consequences of sex to be governed by a set of robust relational obliga-
tions. It is called marriage. The lovers-as-strangers paradigm makes a lot 
more sense when viewed as one element of a broader societal strategy 
aimed at channeling sex into an institution designed and improved over the 
139 See People v. Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 447 (Ct. App. 1967) ("[C]onsent of the victim is not 
generally a defense to assault or battery, except in a situation involving ordinary physical contact or 
blows incident to sports such as football, boxing or wrestling . . . . Even if it be assumed that the vic-
tim ... did in fact ... submit to a beating which was so severe as to constitute an aggravated assault, 
defendant's conduct in inflicting that beating was no less violative of a penal statute obviously designed 
to prohibit one human being from severely or mortally injuring another."); State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 
303, 305-07 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (affirming Collier's assault conviction in holding that sadomasoch-
ism does not qualify as any activity to which a participant can consent to assault); Commonwealth v. 
Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (Mass. 1980) (''The fact that violence may be related to sexual activity 
(or may even be sexual activity to the person inflicting pain on another ... ) does not prevent the State 
from protecting its citizens against physical harm .... The general rule is: 'It is settled that to commit a 
battery upon a person with such violence that bodily harm is likely to result is unlawful, and consent the-
reto is immaterial."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 78 N.E.2d 697, 705 (Mass. 1948) (emphasis in 
original))). But see People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 167--69 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that 
email communications in which the complainant referred to her prior sadomasochistic activities with 
third parties tended to establish a likelihood of consent). 
140 NEST Rules, supra note 138. 
951 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
centuries to deal with its consequences. But this strategy has brought a de-
batable degree of success over time, and some historians insist that the 
theory behind it is flawed. The central function of marriage, they argue, 
was to forge alliances around power and property rather than to regulate the 
vulnerabilities that come along with reproduction. 141 
In any case, channeling sex into marriage today is clearly ineffective. 
Most Americans-secular and religious alike-have nonmarital sex, and 
women aged 18-24 have the highest number of unintended pregnancies. 142 
A new approach tailored to our "postvirginal world"143 is due. 
A. Marriage and Accidental Procreation 
"[A]n orderly society requires some mechanism for coping with the 
fact that sexual intercourse commonly results in pregnancy and childbirth," 
wrote dissenting Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Robert Cordy in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 144 and "[t]he institution of mar-
riage is that mechanism."145 According to Justice Cordy, marriage should 
be limited to heterosexuals because the raison d'etre of marriage-
141 See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 34 (2005) ("The story that marriage was in-
vented for the protection of women is still the most widespread myth about the origins of marriage."); 
id. at 31 ("Probably the single most important function of marriage through most of history ... was its 
role in establishing cooperative relationships between families and communities."); see also id. at 34-49 
(discussing the invention of marriage). NANCY F. Corr, PUBLIC Vows 15 (2002) ("When the colonies 
declared independence and joined together in a new nation, a marital metaphor be-
came ... compelling . . . . Marriage, being a voluntary and long-sustained bond, provided a ready emb-
lem .... As an intentional and harmonious juncture of individuals for mutual protection, economic 
advantage, and common interest, the marriage bond resembled the social contract that produced gov-
ernment."); E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 61 (2004) ("Much of medieval European peasant 
society took it for granted that courting young men and women would go walking all night ... so long 
as the couple married once she was pregnant, which is why roughly a third of brides were pregnant on 
their wedding day, and why most suits in ecclesiastical courts had to do with 'pre-contracts'--one per-
son insisting that the other, now trying to marry another, had already implicitly married her in some 
midnight rendezvous .... The Church licensed prostitutes' guilds and collected regular dispensation 
fees for their trade, assuming prostitution to be the only way to stop male lust from overwhelming ho-
norable mothers. Priests took concubines so often that by the late Middle Ages there was actually a 
Church fee schedule for priests' concubines and bastards."). 
142 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
143 JOAN JACOBS BRUMBERG, THE BODY PROJECT: AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GIRLS 
143 (1997). Sociologists describe a "hookup culture" on college campuses that leaves students who do 
not participate in it on the margins of the social scene, describing themselves as "abnormal." KATHLEEN 
A. BOGLE, HOOKING UP: SEX, DATING, AND RELATIONSHIPS ON CAMPUS 64-71 (2008) (describing par-
ticular college students who consciously choose not to "hook up," their motivations for doing so, and the 
ostracism many who choose this route feel they face). 
144 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,995 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
The case held that a bar against same-sex marriage violated the state's constitution. 
145 !d. 
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regulating accidental procreation-is a nonissue for gay and lesbian lov-
ers.l46 
Cordy and those who follow his lead are correct that heterosexuals face 
unique risks; accidental procreation does demand regulation. But marriage 
is not the ultimate answer to the problem. Marriage fulfills many worthy 
functions, but as society's main mechanism for safeguarding the interests of 
the accidentally pregnant, it is failing. 
Marriage does guarantee spouses a minimal level of mutual support. A 
pregnant woman married to the man with whom she conceives is thus mar-
ginally safer, as a matter of law, than a pregnant woman who is unwed. 147 
This de jure safety, however, does not always translate into de facto bene-
fits, and marriage may lock a woman into a harmful relationship with the 
only alternative-divorce-having potentially devastating economic conse-
quences.148 But even if we bracket these dangers, marriage is not the an-
swer to the special relationship that arises with conception because 
accidental conception also happens outside of marriage. 149 It happens de-
spite the carrots privileging spouses over unmarried couples (such as mar-
146 See Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric 
of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. I, 3--4 (2009) ("Justice Cordy's dissenting opinion 
[in Goodridge] presented marriage as a necessary channeling of male sexuality to useful and policed re-
production. For Justice Cordy, marriage is an institution designed to create a safe social and legal space 
for accidental heterosexual reproduction, a space that is not necessary for same-sex couples who, by de-
finition, cannot accidentally reproduce. Following the publication of Goodridge, Cordy's rationale was 
taken up by the majority in every other state supreme court (saving the California ... and Connecti-
cut ... ), and many state district and appellate courts, that heard a same-sex marriage case. Without 
marriage, these opinions suggest, heterosexual people would labor under the misimpression that repro-
duction is acceptable without a long-term commitment to parenting. By limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples-people who might accidentally reproduce through their sexual relations-the state can 
send a message that marriage is the proper space for reproduction and constrain an unwieldy and dan-
gerous male (hetero )sexuality that would otherwise cause social chaos."). 147 Note however that economically dependent spouses generally have few mechanisms for enforc-
ing their entitlements during marriage. Spouses' economic rights generally vest at divorce. For a dis-
cussion of spouses' limited economic rights during an ongoing marriage, see Alicia B. Kelly, Money 
Mailers in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in Ongoing Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REv. 113, 144-51 (2008); see also Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Lave: 
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. I, 34 (1996) (Silbaugh explains that spouses' duty of mu-
tual support is "not directly enforceable between the parties when married. The support obligation may 
be enforceable during a marriage only by third party creditors who may sue one spouse for certain very 
narrow categories of debts ... undertaken by the other."). Even at divorce, while property distribution 
determinations may take childcare contributions into account, they do not look at pregnancy and the "la-
bor" of childbirth for purposes of determining spouses' contributions to the marriage. 148 See FINEMAN, supra note II, at 228--30 (arguing that marriage and the "sexual family"-i.e., a 
conception of family focused on sexual affiliation rather than on the mother/child relationship-
perpetuate gender inequality); Appleton, supra note 5, at 296--97 (describing family law's failure to de-
liver on the presumed promises of marriage). 149 See COONTZ, supra note 141, at 112. 
953 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
riage-based tax benefits)l 50 and despite the sticks discouraging nonmarital 
sex (like social pressures in religious communities)151 and sex under the age 
of consent (statutory rape laws). 152 Historically, in fact, rather than guaran-
teeing all pregnant women a minimal level of support, marriage limited 
men's responsibility to just one of their companions. 153 
In any case, while marriage used to be "the only option for a socially 
sanctioned intimate relationship,"154 most Americans today have sex outside 
of marriage155 during their teens. 156 Even the abstinence movement within 
150 Appleton, supra note 5, at 273 ("By licensing marriage and attaching to it material and status-
based benefits, the state singles out the favored, 'legitimate' site for sexual activity, and clearly commu-
nicates its preference for monogamy."); Shari Motro, Op-Ed., Single and Paying for It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2004, at 15. 
151 See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 42-44 (2010). 
152 For an overview of statutory rape law, see Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, 
Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 75, 111-16 
(2007). 
153 
"[I]n the English legal tradition," for example, explain Kerry Abrams and Peter Brooks, 
"[m]arriage ... functioned not as a check on the wildness of male heterosexuality but as a way for men 
to maintain sexual freedom without adverse financial consequences." Abrams & Brooks, supra note 
146, at 9. Marriage obviously provided no protections to mistresses, prostitutes, or slaves. See Larson, 
supra note 9, at 389-90 ("Victorian ... conventions of female sexual modesty protected 'respectable' 
women only at the expense of prostitutes, enslaved women, and domestic servants, against whom male 
sexual interest was redirected."). 
Some might counter that the benefits of marriage protect women by deterring extramarital sex, the-
reby reducing the instances of pregnancies out of wedlock. Some feminists also believe that over much 
of history, channeling sex into marriage and punishing extramarital sex through criminal fornication 
laws produced a net benefit for women. See HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note lO, at 276 ("Given natu-
ral and social vulnerabilities in sex and reproduction, the weighty and mutual obligations of socially en-
forced marriage was a better outcome than most women could have expected from sexual bargaining on 
their own .... [L]aws against fornication generally elevated the status of women in history by increas-
ing the price that men paid for heterosexual access."); KRISTIN LUKER, TAKING CHANCES: ABORTION 
AND THE DECISION NOT TO CONTRACEPT 116 (1975) ("It is in the area of sanctioned sexuality that 
women suffer the most dramatic loss of bargaining power in courtship. Under the traditional taboos sur-
rounding intercourse for the first half of [the twentieth] century, sanctioned sexual expression was a 
scarce commodity and one which was a powerful inducement to marriage. In general ... the stricter the 
norms against premarital intercourse, the more valuable sex becomes as a currency of bargaining in the 
marriage market."). ln light of the prevalence ofnonmarital sex today, however, the relevance of these 
objections is largely historical. 
154 Elizabeth S. Scott, Ma"iage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 225. 
155 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 151, at 60 ("Social science research ... suggests that well 
over 90% of all adults engage in sex before they marry.") As Cahn and Carl>one show, the main cultural 
divide in America today seems to be not between unmarried youth who abstain and those who are sex-
ually active. Rather, the main division is in how people tend to handle an unplanned pregnancy. Con-
servatives tend toward the "shotgun wedding"; liberals are more likely to terminate the pregnancy. See 
generally LAUREN F. WINNER, REAL SEX: THE NAKED TRUTH ABOUT CHASTITY 14-19 (2005) (detail-
ing the prevalence of"sexual sin in contemporary Christendom"). 
156 Facts on American Teens' Sexual and Reproductive Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.htrnl. For a related discussion, see Lawrence B. Finer & 
Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 
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conservative Christian communities has delayed the age of first intercourse 
only marginally. 157 Some studies have shown that teens who take chastity 
pledges are also less likely to use birth control, presumably because "the 
use of birth control implies that one thought about sex beforehand; one 
planned for it."158 
Not only does marriage fail to deter accidental procreation, but the so-
lution it offers young people who marry because of an accidental pregnan-
cy-the preferred fallback in conservative communities-may also be less 
than ideal. A "shotgun marriage" will guarantee the woman a baseline level 
of support,159 but early marriages (particularly those "compelled by an im-
provident pregnancy")l60 are more likely than other marriages to end in di-
vorce.161 Furthermore, the financial and emotional costs of dissolving a 
failed marriage may outweigh the temporary security it provides during 
pregnancy. 162 Thus when pregnancy is accidental, couples whose actual 
emotional relationship is not one of lifelong commitment may be better 
2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 92-93 (2006), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/3809006.pdf; Henshaw, supra note 3, at 27. 157 See WINNER, supra note 155, at 17 ("In 2001, a study of 6,800 students showed that virgins who 
took the [True Love Waits abstinence] pledge were likely to abstain from sex for eighteen months longer 
than those who did not take the pledge. This ... means simply that a lot of abstinence pledgers are hav-
ing sex at nineteen instead of eighteen."); Heather D. Boonstra, Advocates Call for a New Approach Af-
ter the Era of 'Abstinence-Only' Sex Education, 12 GUTIMACHER POL'Y REv. 6, 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/llgpr120106.html. In addition to her critique of current absti-
nence programs, Winner's book aims-through personal sexual accounts, theological references, and an 
honest discussion of cultural trends-to provide modem Christians with a compelling argument for the 
admittedly challenging imperative of abstinence until marriage. 158 Jd. More broadly, rather than functioning as an insurance policy against unintended procreation, 
marriage is more commonly the form of choice for couples who intend to conceive. "Many people to-
day marry," write Kerry Abrams and Peter Brooks, "once they think they have found the person they 
want to procreate with, not because they have decided to have sex for the first time and want to insure 
themselves against 'accidents,' but because they have been (irresponsibly?) engaging in sex for quite 
some time and only now are ready to settle down and have a child." Abrams & Brooks, supra note 146, 
at 32. 159 The scope of this Article is limited to unmarried conception, but the treatment of pregnancy in 
marriage and divorce law is also lacking. 
160 CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 151, at 60. 161 See id. at 26 ("[D]ivorce risk ... increases with younger age of marriage, lower economic status, 
and having a baby either prior to marriage or within the first seven months after marriage. Accordingly, 
family strategies that either emphasize marrying young, or marriage as the solution to an improvident 
pregnancy[,] are likely to increase rates of divorce, all other things being equal."). 162 Marriage provides a useful way to formalize intimate relations between lovers who would 
choose to marry regardless of the risk of procreative accidents. By standardizing a basket of rights and 
responsibilities between adults who intend to unite for life, it absolves couples of the need to deliberate 
and negotiate over every aspect of their union. Its maximalist one-size-fits-all defaults designate spous-
es as each others' primary beneficiaries, caretakers, guardians, agents, and representatives in all aspects 
oflife-financial, medical, spiritual. In this capacity, spouses replace parents and siblings as a person's 
most significant legal relation. Though pregnancy and co-parenting are life-altering undertakings, mar-
riage binds people to a broader, more extensive commitment than is needed to protect lovers who con-
ceive and their unplanned children. 
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served by an intermediate status that is calibrated to their situation. 163 The 
"shotgun" practice is thus at best an incomplete answer to the problem. 
Justice Cordy concludes that 
[A]side from an act of heterosexual intercourse nine months prior to childbirth, 
there is no process for creating a relationship between a man and a woman as 
the parents of a particular child. The institution of marriage fills this void by 
formally binding the husband-father to his wife and child .... The alternative, 
a society without the institution of marriage ... would be chaotic. 164 
But since marriage does not always link intercourse, procreation, and re-
sponsibility, and since it does not always fill the void by binding a man to 
the woman with whom he conceived, the blinkered reliance on marriage to 
solve the problem is misplaced. A society without an institution that fulfills 
these critical functions is indeed chaotic. It is the society in which we now 
live. 
B. Matching Love Law to Love Life 
What might a fairer law of conception look like? In love law-as in 
love life-one size does not fit all. Relations between unmarried lovers 
who conceive might therefore be handled differently depending on the type 
of intercourse that produced the pregnancy. Again, this Article is con-
cerned with pregnancies that result from sex that is consensual and involves 
no fraud or deceit. For our purposes, two types of consensual, good-faith 
sex might be distinguished-<:onsensual sex that creates a set of baseline re-
lational obligations, and consensual sex in which the parties expect and in-
tend for there to be no strings attached. The former might serve as the basis 
for our default legal sex code, a code premised on contractual or equity-
based principles; the later might inform an alternative for those who wish to 
opt for a lovers-as-strangers rule. 
1. The Relational Default.-Nonmarital intimate relationships used 
to inhabit a legal no-man's land. Over the past few decades, however, 
courts and legislatures have begun to recognize unmarried partners who live 
together as forming a unique type of relationship under theories that parallel 
163 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 151, at 59 ("[M]arriage at younger ages is a risky enterprise. 
It has historically required a high degree of conununity-reinforced socialization into marital roles-
including stereotypical gender roles, male financial contributions and female dependence-to succeed. 
New research emphasizes that full emotional maturity does not occur until the mid-twenties, and the less 
than fully mature early twenties brain (especially if male) is primed for risk taking and sexual experi-
mentation. At the same time, the modem economy provides fewer opportunities for the men who are 
ready to start families in their early twenties to move into productive employment."); see also 
HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 10, at 276 ("Rather than try to force sexual actors into marriage, we 
choose to modify that anarchic state of nature that characterizes nonmarital sexual bargaining."). But 
see Scott, supra note 154, at 235 ("[E]ven broken marriages provide financial and relationship benefits 
for dependent family members."). 
164 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,996 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
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contractual and equity-based theories of marriage. Where a couple forma-
lizes their domestic partnership and then one partner abandons the other, re-
lief to the abandoned partner may be granted under contract principles. 165 
Where a couple has made no explicit agreement formalizing their commit-
ment, many jurisdictions nevertheless recognize that a partnership was 
formed and provide protections when the relationship breaks down under 
either an implied contract theory166 or an equity-based status approach. 167 
A similar logic might apply to sexual partners who conceive, whether 
or not they live together. From a contractual perspective, partners who con-
ceive might be recognized under the rubric of a distinct legal relationship 
because, in many instances, an agreement to assume mutual obligations of 
support and communication can be inferred. Even where such an agree-
ment cannot be inferred, sexual partners who conceive should be legally re-
sponsible towards each other as a normative matter. 
In general, the relationship status of sexual partners who conceive 
might be founded on two guiding principles: (1) communication obligations 
surrounding conception should take the parties' individual interests as well 
as their relational interests into account; and (2) responsibilities for the costs 
165 See Scott, supra note 154, at 255 ("Under ordinary contract principles, courts should enforce 
agreements between cohabiting parties dealing with property distribution and support. Many courts 
have adopted this view in recent years and have been ready to enforce these contracts. If a couple has an 
express written agreement, enforcement is usually straightforward. Sometimes, even without a writing, 
substantial evidence exists of the couple's agreement that property acquired during the union would be 
shared or that one party would provide post-dissolution support."). 
166 See Scott, supra note 154, at 256 ("Courts' responses to financial claims by cohabitating parties 
based on conduct rather than express promise have been mixed. In general, contracts implied in fact 
will be legally enforced if the conduct is promissory-that is, if it is sufficiently clear to demonstrate an 
understanding between the parties that an obligation exists." (footnote omitted)). Scott has gone as far 
as arguing that contract principles justifY a standard default imposing marriage-like commitments on 
couples who live together for many years and conduct themselves as married. As long as they have not 
explicitly contracted otherwise, she argues, "an agreement to assume marital obligations can be in-
ferred." Scott, supra note 154, at 258; see also Shahar Lifshitz, Ma"ied Against Their Wil/11-13 (Bar-
Han Univ. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 06-09, 2009), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1352043 (explaining two models of implicit contractual relationships between 
cohabitating couples). 
167 A minority of jurisdictions and the American Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution 
reject the contractual approach in favor a status-based solution. Contract is seen as a poor vehicle for 
regulating intimate relations for two main reasons. First, as ALI chief reporter Ira Ellman put it, "people 
do not think of their intimate relationships in contract terms." Ira Ellman, "Contractual Thinking" Was 
Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1365, 1373 (2001). Second, the contract rubric fails to 
address the equitable claims of abandoned partners where no implied agreement can be reasonably in-
ferred. !d. at 1372 n.39. But see Scott, supra note 154, at 262-63 ("[A] contractual framework is com-
patible with liberal values, and thus has a normative appeal that the status-based A.L.I. approach lacks. 
The proposed default rules rest on realistic assumptions about the intentions of many couples in informal 
unions, while at the same time offering protection to naive parties whose expectations may not be shared 
by their partners."). The better, more honest reason for imposing marital obligations on domestic part-
ners, the argument goes, is fairness. See Lifshitz, supra note 166, at 13-16 (describing different ratio-
nales for the status model's equation of marital obligations and cohabitation). 
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of pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage, and abortion broadly conceived 
should be equitably shared by both partners. Again, the goal of this Article 
is to start a conversation. What follows are a range of possible parameters 
for structuring a new relational default. 
a. Communication.-As we have seen, the lovers-as-strangers 
paradigm translates into a default that gives men almost no entitlement to 
be informed of conception. When sex takes place in the context of a good-
faith nonviolent relationship, the law thus disregards a basic and legitimate 
relational value. The status quo is also problematic because of the distinc-
tions it draws between rich and poor. The current rule gives financially in-
dependent women a carte blanche to hide pregnancy and birth while 
applying a mandatory disclosure policy to women who are unable to shoul-
der the costs of childcare alone. 168 While it is true that the policy requiring 
indigent women applying for public assistance to identify the father of their 
child is rooted in a concern for public funds, not for the relational interests 
of the father, the result effectively distributes privacy privileges based on 
economics. 
Ideally, men and women who engage in the type of sex that results in 
pregnancy-usually repeated acts of unprotected intercourse-will either 
share a no-strings-attached understanding or they will both feel safe dis-
cussing an unintended pregnancy. But for many women, notifying their 
partner of conception spells danger. 169 It may also undermine a woman's 
right to choose if once notified, the man pressures or coerces her to undergo 
or forego an abortion. 170 Even if the woman faces no such dangers, placing 
all of the communication burden on her would require her to proactively 
contact a man who may have no legitimate interest in the matter-for ex-
ample, a man who demonstrated no relational commitment beyond the sex-
ual encounter. Nevertheless, a default that gives no consideration 
whatsoever to nonviolent men's interest in knowing about a pregnancy goes 
too far. 
One possibility for a more balanced approach is to design a limited no-
tice system modeled on the registry system some states use to determine 
when a putative father must be notified of a mother's intention to place their 
child up for adoption. 171 Specifically, the act of intercourse could put a man 
168 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text. 
170 The fact that some women are coerced into having abortions does not, however, justifY abortion 
restrictions. See also Law, supra note 22, at 1034--35 (arguing that a statute requiring a pregnant woman 
to notifY the man who impregnated her of the fact of the pregnancy, while preferable to abortion-only 
notification policies, would be indefensibly oppressive to women). See generally Siegel, supra note 84, 
at 1687-92 (explaining how the woman-protective antiabortion argument blends feminist arguments 
with traditional gender stereotypes). 
171 I credit Susan Appleton with this idea (which she suggested without necessarily endorsing). For 
a recent discussion of putative father registries, see Laura Oren, Unmarried Fathers and Adoption: 
'"Perfecting" or '"Abandoning" an Opportunity Interest, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 253,266-67 (2007) ("By 
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on a kind of constructive notice of the possibility of conception. 172 It would 
place the burden on him to either remain involved in the woman's life so as 
to be able to observe any changes in her body or to register as a putative fa-
ther in a public registry. Upon such registration, the woman would be noti-
fied, which would then shift the burden to her to notify the man of 
conception--either promptly after she learns of it or once the pregnancy has 
progressed beyond a certain stage. A man who fails to register would for-
feit his right to know of the pregnancy. Where notification might endanger 
the woman or others, she would be free to keep the pregnancy secret regard-
less of whether the man registered. 
This Article does not address the ideal mechanism for administering 
this "danger" exception, but it is worth noting that the challenges it poses 
are not novel. When indigent mothers apply for public assistance, they are 
often required to identify the father of their child as a condition for receiv-
ing benefits unless doing so would expose them to danger. 173 The Pennsyl-
2007, at least thirty-four states had adopted one form or another of putative father regi-
stry .... Typically, they permit registration before the birth of the child and no later than thirty days af-
ter. . .. The consequences of not registering can be strikingly different from one state to another. In 
some states, any putative father who wants to be notified about a possible adoption proceeding must reg-
ister or lose the opportunity for notice and objection. In others, the statute requires due diligence to 
identify and notify putative fathers, including those who have failed to register."); see also 7 50 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12.1 (West 2009) ("The Department of Children and Family Services shall estab-
lish a Putative Father Registry for the purpose of determining the identity and location of a putative fa-
ther of a minor child who is, or is expected to be, the subject of an adoption proceeding, in order to 
provide notice of such proceeding to the putative father . . . . [F]ailure to timely register with the Puta-
tive Father Registry (i) shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of any hear-
ing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of the child, and the consent or surrender of that person to 
the adoption of the child is not required, and (ii) shall constitute an abandonment of the child and shall 
be prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support termination of such father's parental rights un-
der this Act."); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1983) ("The State of New York maintains a 
'putative father registry.' A man who files with that registry demonstrates his intent to claim paternity 
of a child born out of wedlock and is therefore entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt that 
child .... In addition to the persons whose names are listed on the putative father registry, New York 
law requires that notice of an adoption proceeding be given to several other classes of possible fathers of 
children born out of wedlock-those who have been adjudicated to be the father, those who have been 
identified as the father on the child's birth certificate, those who live openly with the child and the 
child's mother and who hold themselves out to be the father, those who have been identified as the fa-
ther by the mother in a sworn written statement, and those who were married to the child's mother be-
fore the child was six months old."). 
172 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110(l)(a) (West 2008) (putting putative fathers on con-
structive notice once they have engaged in sexual intercourse); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1250(£) (2008) 
("Any man who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a woman is deemed to be on legal notice that a 
child may be conceived and the man is entitled to all legal rights and obligations resulting therefrom. 
Lack of knowledge of the pregnancy does not excuse failure to timely register. In the event that the 
identity and whereabouts of the birth father are reasonably ascertainable, written notice of the existence 
of an adoption plan and the availability of registration with the Putative Father Registry shall be pro-
vided by certified mailing to the man's last known address."). 
173 See Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater Sanctions and the Failure to 
Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 367,368--69 (2000). 
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vania statute struck down by Casey also contained a similar exception for 
women in danger of bodily injury. 174 Unfortunately, these exceptions have 
been poorly crafted and ineffectively applied. 175 Protecting pregnant wom-
en against violence is of paramount importance, but I am not convinced that 
the most effective way to do so over time is through the minimal support 
and communication defaults of the lovers-as-strangers paradigm. Even a 
minimally enforceable rule directing a woman to notify the man only if he 
makes the first proactive relational step (by remaining involved with her or 
contacting a public registry) and only if she subjectively believes doing so 
is safe and wise would carry a positive expressive value; it would replace 
the current disregard for a man's relational interests with a clear normative 
priority for connection over separation. 
b. Support.-Pregnancy's effects on a woman's health, career, 
and education produce real costs that, to the extent they are not supported 
by public funds, 176 should be borne by both a woman and the man with 
whom she conceives. Quantifying these costs is difficult, but the alterna-
tive-effectively valuing them at zero--is unacceptable. 177 Two broadly 
conceived approaches to determining the extent of men's financial obliga-
tions might be considered. First, pregnancy-related obligations might be 
based on the costs of each particular pregnancy. Alternately, pregnant 
women might be entitled to a standard award based on average pregnancy 
costs adjusting for certain objective variables like the length of the pregnan-
cy. Either of these alternatives might integrate an additional element keyed 
to men's financial profile designed to increase their incentives to prevent 
pregnancy. 
Both approaches present valuation challenges. Fortunately, we need 
not start our pregnancy-valuation discussion from scratch. Negligence 
awards in wrongful pregnancy cases178 in which a botched sterilization pro-
174 See Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,908--09 (2002). 
175 See id. at 888 ("The 'bodily injury' exception could not be invoked by a married woman whose 
husband, if notified, would, in her reasonable belief, threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have an abor-
tion to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her in future child custody or divorce pro-
ceedings; (c) inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, her children or other 
persons; (d) inflict bodily harm on other persons such as children, family members or other loved ones; 
or (e) use his control over finances to deprive of necessary monies for herself or her children."); Fonta-
na, supra note 173, at 380-87 (discussing the cooperation requirement and good cause exceptions to that 
requirement in several federal and state laws and the insufficient protections they provide to potential 
victims of domestic violence). 
176 Again, the role of the state in supporting dependents generally, and pregnant women in particu-
lar, is outside the scope of this Article. 
177 See generally Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997). 
178 Wrongful pregnancy cases, also referred to as wrongful conception cases, are usually cases that 
involve a failed sterilization, abortion, or other contraception procedure or prescription which, due to a 
health care provider or pharmacist's negligence, results in an unwanted pregnancy. Martha C. Romney 
& Dorothy Duffy, Medicine and Law: Recent Developments, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 351,358 (1990). 
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cedure leads to an unplanned pregnancy and surrogate motherhood com-
pensation arrangements179 provide useful starting points. Naturally, many 
of the issues that determine the awards in the tort and surrogacy contexts 
are different from the issues affecting sexual partners who conceive. 
Wrongful pregnancies are the fault of negligent surgeons, while surrogate 
mothers volunteer to bear a planned child for another family-both are very 
different from the relational situation with which we are concerned. Never-
theless, the in-depth examinations of the real costs of pregnancy in these 
contexts are instructive. 
Most jurisdictions' wrongful pregnancy recovery allowance covers 
prenatal and postnatal medical expenses, including expenses of any compli-
cations associated with the pregnancy or birth as well as the mother's pain 
and suffering during the pregnancy and delivery. 180 Some jurisdictions also 
allow recovery for lost wages during pregnancy, delivery, and a postnatal 
period.181 Finally, in some jurisdictions women may be compensated for 
emotional distress182 and any permanent impairment suffered by the mother 
as a result of the pregnancy, the delivery, or subsequent corrective proce-
179 On the legality of surrogate motherhood arrangements, see Bridget J. Crawford, Taxing Surro-
gacy, in CHALLENGING GENDER INEQUALITY IN FISCAL POLICY MAKING (Asa Gunnarsonn et a!. eds., 
forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1422180 ("Only a small number of states expressly permits or prohibits surrogacy. In New Hamp-
shire, Florida and Ohio-to name just three-paid surrogacy agreements are enforceable, but they are 
subject to stringent regulations. In contrast, in New York and at least five other states, paid surrogacy 
agreements are void, unenforceable and potentially subject to criminal penalties. Most states, however, 
occupy a 'middle ground', with limited or no statutory or case law authority that speaks to the validity or 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts and with no civil or criminal prohibition either."). 
180 See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982) (allowing for the recovery of damag-
es against a doctor held negligent in a "wrongful pregnancy" case based on the mother's physical pain 
and suffering, mental anguish, her husband's loss of consortium, and medical expenses incurred by the 
parents as a result of the pregnancy); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761-62 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (allowing damages in a wrongful pregnancy suit for pain and suf-
fering due to pregnancy, cost of a tubal ligation, loss of consortium, and medical expenses related to 
pregnancy). 
181 See Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (N.H. 1982); Beardsley v. Wierdsman, 650 P.2d 
288, 292 (Wyo. 1982). 
182 See Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751-52 (Tenn. 1987) ("In assessing these damages, the jury 
may consider the reason for which Plaintiff underwent the pregnancy avoidance technique. Other con-
siderations may include the age of the parent or parents, marital status, the number of other children for 
whom the parent or parents are already responsible, and the economic condition of the parent or parents. 
The degree of distress could be amplified by a combination of these factors."); Miller v. Johnson, 343 
S.E.2d 301, 305 (Va. 1986). Indeed, in some cases even the woman's "struggle whether to rear, place 
for adoption, or terminate the pregnancy" is reimbursable. Gore, 728 S.W.2d at 752. See also White v. 
United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981) (upholding the potential recoverability of damages 
for emotional and mental anguish, provided the requisite physical injury or willful, malicious, or wanton 
conduct accompanies it); Weintraub v. Brown, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634,641-42 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (allowing re-
covery for a mother's emotional distress resulting from the actual or anticipated physical pain and su f-
fering associated with pregnancy and delivery following an unsuccessful vasectomy). 
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dures. 183 Wrongful pregnancy cases also provide for recovery if the woman 
chooses to terminate the pregnancy. 184 
Compensation agreements between surrogate mothers and intended 
parents account for the fact that the real costs to the woman exceed the ac-
tual medical bills she incurs during and immediately following the pregnan-
cy by tens of thousands of dollars. In addition to compensation for the 
service of carrying the intended parents' child, surrogates often receive ad-
ditional allowances to cover miscellaneous expenses associated with preg-
nancy, such as maternity clothing, child care for existing children, lost 
wages, and meals. 185 The intended parents also generally cover all medical 
costs not reimbursed by insurance, as well as life insurance premiums for 
the birth mother. 186 When a surrogate mother miscarries or undergoes a 
medically necessary abortion, she is paid a prorated portion of her fee for 
the period of time during which she carried the fetus, as well as an addition-
al amount for her pain and suffering. 187 
183 See Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839, 843--45 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding that a mother may po-
tentially recover damages resulting from an unsuccessful sterilization procedure based on permanent 
scars, pain, suffering, and physical impairment). Jurisdictions differ, however, on whether the tortfeasor 
doctor may also be held liable for the costs of raising a child. Most states have found that the birth of a 
normal, healthy, albeit unwanted child is not a compensable injury. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 
2d 718, 721-23 (Ala. 1982); Flowers v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077-78 (D.C. 1984); Byrd 
v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 465--67 (Kan. 1985); C.S. v. Neilson, 767 P.2d 504, 516 (Utah 
1988); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 876-78 (W.Va. 1985); Bruce Keplinger & James J. Cra-
mer, WrongfUl Pregnancy: A House Divided, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 496, 501-05 (1988). That said, ami-
nority of jurisdictions do allow for recovery of child rearing expenses. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 
707 F.2d 1544, 1552-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Univ. of Ariz. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 
1301 (Ariz. 1983); Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (Ct. App. 1976); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 
A.2d 883, 884-85 (Conn. 1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (Md. 1984); Green v. Suda-
kin, 265 N.W.2d 411, 412-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that public policy considerations could 
not warrant physicians' exemption from the consequences of failing to notify a patient that they had not 
performed an agreed-upon sterilization procedure); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175-
76 (Minn. 1977). 
184 See Gore, 728 S.W.2d at 752. 
185 See Surrogate Mothers, Inc., Approximate Expenses, http://www.surrogatemothers.com/ 
expense.htrnl (last visited Aug. 28, 201 0). 
186 See Circle Surrogacy, Payment/Bills, http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/surrogate/faq.htrnl# 
Payments (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
187 See Shelley M. Tarnoff, When Things Go Wrong: Pregnancy Termination in Su"ogacy, OPTS, 
June 1, 2010, http://www.opts.com/pgterm.htrn ("If the surrogate undergoes a therapeutic abortion or 
spontaneous abortion, according to the terms of the agreement, she is usually paid a pro rata portion of 
her fee, calculated by multiplying her total fee by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of 
days of pregnancy and the denominator of which is the normal term of pregnancy. Additionally, a fee of 
$500.00 is often paid to the surrogate for undergoing a therapeutic abortion, selective reduction, amni-
ocentesis or other invasive procedure to compensate her for associated pain and suffering."); see also 
Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 30, 2008, at 42 ('The typical cost for 
gestational surrogacy ... would be anywhere from $30,000 to $60,000 . . . . The fees to the surrogate 
would be paid out in monthly installments, not in one lump sum at the end. In this way the surrogate 
would be reimbursed for her monthly gestational responsibilities even if the pregnancy ended in miscar-
riage. No money ever changes hands directly between the intended parents ... and the surrogate. All 
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Because pregnancy and childbirth may bring a woman both emotional 
and physical joy,188 a question arises as to whether these positive effects 
should offset her physical and emotional pain for valuation purposes. This 
poses obvious difficulties, but omitting pain and suffering entirely is also 
problematic, especially in the cases of women suffering from debilitating 
postpartum depression, women who miscarry, and women who undergo a 
traumatic abortion. Possible solutions include setting a standard limited 
award for the pain and inconvenience of pregnancy or to omit pain from the 
calculation except for in exceptional cases. In any case, even if pain and 
suffering are taken out of the picture entirely, the real costs of pregnancy 
will almost certainly exceed the child-support type paradigm currently in 
force. 
Once the costs of a given pregnancy are calculated, they might be allo-
cated based on an equal division principle or on a formula that accounts for 
differences in the parties' marginal utility of wealth. 189 The main advantag-
es of equal division are its simplicity and predictability. Marginal utility-
based division, by contrast, is cumbersome, but it has the potential to allo-
cate costs more equitably than a rigid equal division standard. Because it 
keys each partner's obligation to his or her financial situation, the method 
ensures that both parties are significantly affected and it eliminates perverse 
incentives that may arise when parties differ in wealth. 
But both of these methods presume that the diverse physical and 
psychic costs of pregnancy can be easily plugged into a formula. In reality, 
translating them into a dollar amount may be more of an art than a science, 
and some cases may present alternative, nonmonetary opportunities. A 
third alternative for allocating the subjective costs of a particular pregnancy 
is by using a judicial case-by-case discretionary approach similar to equita-
the money goes into an escrow account ... , and a third party pays out the monthly fees. [Intended par-
ents] and surrogates are discouraged from discussing money. This is partly to remove the air of com-
mercialism from the proceedings."). 
188 See Welcome to Orgasmic Birth, supra note 21. 
189 The marginal utility method would Jessen the woman's burden and increase the man's such that 
both suffer a comparable Joss. The result would mitigate the woman's burden only to the point at which 
the man would "share her pain." For example, a wealthy woman's pregnancy-related costs expressed in 
dollars would typically be high because her low marginal utility of wealth makes her pain ''worth more," 
so she requires more dollars to be made whole. But if she conceives with a man of modest means she 
would be entitled only to a small fraction of her total loss, an amount roughly balancing the parties' Joss 
relative to their overall circumstance. A poor woman who conceives with a rich man would be entitled 
to an amount close to but never exceeding her experienced loss, which will be much lower in dollars 
than the Joss of the rich woman. (The poor woman's high marginal utility of wealth means that she re-
quires Jess to be made whole.) Only where both parties are equally wealthy will the payment equal half 
of the woman's loss. 
This method would therefore increase the deterrence potential of the new default rule, protect poor 
men from the risk of devastating losses (should they accidentally impregnate a rich woman), as well as 
limit rich men's risk exposure in the face of gold diggers. A woman who might be tempted to abuse the 
Jaw in order to extract a large payment from a rich man will quickly realize that she will never be able to 
recover more than her own true costs. 
963 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
ble distribution at divorce. Under this approach, judges would have the 
freedom to impose an equitable allocation based on their own consideration 
of relevant factors. 
The pros and cons of this case-by-case method track the pros and cons 
of discretionary approaches to divorce. 190 The main advantage is that it 
would allow decisionmakers to tailor a solution to the specific facts and cir-
cumstances of the case}91 Relevant factors might include the parties' age, 
dependents, and behavior leading up to and following the conception. The 
main disadvantage of the discretionary approach is that it creates an open-
ing for the legal system's separation bias to creep back into the allocation 
through individual decisionmakers. 192 It would also be highly uncertain, 
time consuming, and costly. These drawbacks could lower the chances that 
parties would seek to enforce their entitlements in the first place. 
Finally, instead of attempting to value the costs associated with each 
pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion, women could be entitled to a stan-
dard support allowance upon conception and continuing for the duration of 
the pregnancy. This allowance might be based on an estimate of the aver-
age costs of pregnancy, and it might vary based on objective factors like the 
length of the pregnancy and the woman's age. It might also take into ac-
count the parties' relative wealth, producing the same advantages discussed 
in this connection above without the burden of case-by-case valuations. 
It is important to stress that neither the notification nor the cost sharing 
principle should change a woman's right to make the ultimate decision 
about whether to take a pregnancy to term. Just as a husband's objection to 
his wife's decision does not diminish his spousal support duties, the pro-
posed duties triggered by consensual intercourse between unmarried part-
ners should be unaffected if the parties' reproductive preferences diverge. 193 
2. Opportunity to Opt Out.-The relational default proposed above is 
clearly not appropriate for all sexual partners. Some partners want to have 
sex with the mutual understanding that nothing more is expected. Others 
wish to conceive but want no financial or legal relationship with each other. 
19° For a discussion on the drawbacks of broad judicial discretion over divorce, see AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 4.09 cmt. a 
(2000); see also ]ana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (1989) 
("[D]ivorce doctrines that allow for substantial judicial discretion generally operate to women's disad-
vantage . . . . The absence of clear-cut legal standards also affects the negotiation process in ways that 
disadvantage the economically weaker party, generally the woman, in a divorce. Finally, the lack of 
precise standards ... may drive up the costs associated with divorce, particularly attorneys' fees, which 
again penalizes the economically weaker spouse."). 
191 For example, decisionmakers could possibly consider the parties' relative fault, age, dependents, 
and behavior following conception. 
192 I credit Corinna Lain for this insight. 
193 For further discussion of the impact of mandatory pregnancy support on choice, see infra Part 
III.C.5. 
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Partners who truly desire no-liability sex should be permitted to play by 
their own rules, but the onus should be on them to make these rules explicit. 
At first glance, this suggestion may seem out of touch with reality. 
Many, perhaps most, casual partners' expectations regarding unintended 
pregnancy remain unarticulated for a range of reasons. Some do not want 
to think about the risks, others simply trust each other, and still others re-
main silent because they don't want to imply that they don't trust each oth-
er. As one colleague put it, talking about pregnancy before sex can be a 
"buzz kill." 
But Internet dating culture tells a different story. Some sites, for ex-
ample, are explicitly devoted to users looking for "casual encounters"194 or 
"friends with benefits."195 Dating sites with a more diverse membership 
base include preset options allowing users to signal the type of connection 
they are looking for. OKCupid's standard questionnaire, for example, in-
cludes: "Which of these options most closely describes what you're looking 
for in your next relationship? Someone to come home to. Someone to go 
out with. Someone for tonight." It also asks users to indicate whether they 
believe in monogamy and whether they believe contraception is "morally 
wrong."196 And almost all dating sites and personals venues provide a space 
in which users can describe their preferences in their own words. The Ur-
ban Dictionary now includes definitions for euphemisms commonly used in 
such forums, including "NSA"-no strings attached. 197 
Thus, while the suggestion that casual partners make their expectations 
clear before sex may seem jarring at first, plenty of people are already doing 
just that. Indeed, as online dating grows and evolves, in addition to chang-
ing norms among its direct users it may create opportunities for new codes 
among those meeting offline as well. If a relational default becomes law, 
194 Craigslist hosts such listings under categories named "missed connections" and "casual encoun-
ters" for various geographical areas. See, e.g. Craigslist: Atlanta Classifieds for Jobs, Apartments, Per-
sonals, For Sale, Services, Community, http://www.atlanta.craigslist.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
195 See Friends with Benefits, http://findfriendswithbenefits.com (last visited Aug., 2010). 
196 See OKCupid, http://www.OKCupid.com/questions/ask (last visited May, 30, 2010) (users must 
create an account to access this page). JDate.com asks users to indicate whether they are looking for a 
date, a friend, marriage, marriage and children, a long-term relationship, or an activity partner. 
JDate.com-The Leading Jewish Singles Network! Explore the Possibilities, http://www.jdate.com/ 
Applications/Registration/Registration.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). FriendFinder.com advertises 
itself as providing "personals for fun, friends, & love." Friendfinder: Have Fun, Meet People, & Find 
Love, http://www.friendfinder.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
197 See Urban Dictionary, NSA, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=nsa (last visited 
May 27, 2010) ("No Strings Attached, but it doesn't refer to a type of relationship, but to the willing-
ness/desire to have sex without the necessity of a relationship. NSA means lets have some fun without 
creating any obligations beyond the moment. We do what we do tonight and dont [sic] ever have to see 
each other again. But without the negative connotation of one-night stand, even if that is what it is." 
One of the examples supplied reads: "Single successful individual with no time to spend in the bars 
looks for NSA relationship.-craigs/ist"). 
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we may discover that people's capacity for clarity when it comes to intima-
cy is more developed than we have come to expect and accept. 
Where expectations are not discussed, however, the default rule should 
reflect equitable norms by imposing the communication and support obliga-
tions described above. As in the premarital context, unconscionable opt-out 
agreements should be unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Impor-
tantly, the partners' decision to opt out of the relational default should not 
affect their responsibilities vis-a-vis their child. 198 
C. Open Questions 
Well-intentioned legal reforms have a history ofbackfiring_I99 Perhaps 
the delicate relationship between unmarried sexual partners may be one of 
the areas in which the best thing the law can do is stay out. "Sexuality is a 
murky realm of contradiction and ambivalence," writes Camille Paglia. 
It cannot always be understood by social models, which feminism ... insists 
on imposing on it. . . . It cannot be "fixed" by codes of social or moral con-
venience, whether from the political left or right. For nature's fascism is 
greater than that of any society. There is a[ n] ... instability in sexual relations 
that we may have to accept. 200 
198 Child support would continue to begin in utero. As we have seen, disentangling pregnancy-
related expenses incurred for the benefit of a future child from costs borne by the woman in her own 
right necessarily forces arbitrary line drawing. Anything that might add to a pregnant woman's stress 
could affect the fetus's health and well-being. Georgia Justice Hunt's dissent in Coxwell v. Matthews 
captures the view that requiring lovers who conceive to share the price of pleasure broadly conceived 
leads to a slippery slope, an unlimited class of expenses for which men might be obligated to pay. See 
Coxwell v. Matthews, 435 S.E.2d 33, 35 (Ga. 1993) (Hunt, J., dissenting) ("The majority states the tru-
ism that prenatal care for a child has an impact on postnatal care. So, too, do a myriad of other things 
such as: food, shelter, and clothing for the mother, childbirth classes for the mother, exercise classes for 
the mother, classes or courses to assist the mother to stop smoking, drinking, etc. Without any of these, 
the born child's life might be an 'uphill climb."'). Still, similar line-drawing challenges permeate all 
child support determinations; a mother's well-being cannot be completely separated from her child's. 
The findings of scholars and advocates dedicated to crafting the ideal child support regime should thus 
inform the proper determination of in utero costs that may and may not be waivable. 
199 But see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra Legal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and 
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 937, 942 (2007) ("[T]he risks of extralegal cooptation are 
similar to the risks of legal cooptation."); see also Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: 
De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409-12 (2009) (arguing that the right to 
abortion constitutionalized in Roe v. Wade legitimated a minimalist state response to the problems of 
pregnant women indirectly hurting the cause of reproductive justice). 
200 CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE: ART AND DECADENCE FROM NEFERTITI TO EMILY 
DICKINSON 13 (1990); see also KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM, at xv 
( 1994) ("[T]he preoccupation with sexual rules represents an almost utopian faith in our ability to create 
a safe sexual world . . . . [O]ur intense concern with definitions of sexual harassment over the past few 
years demonstrates a deep-felt desire for-and belief in-a neat separation between sex and danger. In 
this time of sexual suspicion, changing roles, and disease, we seem to believe that somewhere out there 
is an instruction manual, a potent mixture of law and etiquette, that will tell us how to lead our sexual 
lives."). 
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Paglia may be right, but as Blackstone observed long ago, it is often tempt-
ing to think of the status quo as natural.201 In reality, a no-strings-attached 
sex code is no closer to the state of nature than the relational default I have 
introduced. Neither is neutral, and maintaining the current rule is a 
choice-a choice that contradicts most people's sensibilities and produces 
unfair and socially harmful results. 
The relational default, however, raises many new questions as well as 
new opportunities. Again, my goal is to start a conversation where none ex-
ists, not to present a fully developed proposal. In this section I explore five 
open questions as an opening for what I hope will become a larger debate. 
1. Impact on Sexual Behavior.-First, how would a relational default 
change sexual behavior ex ante? Under the current paradigm the pill and 
legal abortions are often seen as liberating to women; by separating inter-
course from reproduction they purportedly allow women-like men-to en-
joy sex for its own sake.202 This is at least partially true, but the pill and 
abortion rights also exacerbate sexual inequality.203 Whereas men bear 
some responsibility for a pregnancy taken to term once paternity is estab-
lished, they bear no responsibility for the side effects of contraceptives or 
abortion. This fundamental asymmetry remains in the shadows due in part 
to pharmaceutical companies' successful campaign to obscure the dangers 
of the pill204 and to women's reluctance to discuss their abortion experiences 
publicly.205 Together, these create the impression that love can be free for 
all. As we have seen, love is not free, and the myth that it is jeopardizes all 
women both before and after conception. Before conception, the myth of 
free love ratchets up the pressure towards intercourse.206 After conception, 
it gives men an out.207 
201 As Blackstone said, "we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and invete-
rate custom." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *II. 
202 See Deirdre English, The Fear That Feminism Will Free Men First, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE 
POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 477,480 (Ann Snitow eta!. eds., 1983). 
203 See id. at 477 ("[S]o far, sexual freedom has usually meant a man's right to love and leave a 
pregnant or economically dependent woman."). 
204 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
205 Project Voice, a website that publishes abortion stories online, is trying to break this silence. See 
Project Voice, About Us, http://www.theabortionproject.org/htmllabout_us.php (last visited Aug. 15, 
2010). 
206 See Bell Hooks, Ending Female Sexual Oppression, in FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO 
CENTER 147, 148-50, 152-56 (1984) ("The focus on 'sexual liberation' has always carried with it the 
assumption that the goal of such effort is to make it possible for individuals to engage in more and/or 
better sexual activity. Yet one aspect of sexual norms that many people find oppressive is the assump-
tion that one 'should' be engaged in sexual activity. This 'should' is one expression of sexual coer-
cion."). 
207 As one conservative scholar put it, "[a ]bortion coerces women to handle crises that they did not 
create alone. Yet the men, who are at least equally responsible for the crisis, are relieved of any con-
cern, torment, anguish, or responsibility by a woman's choice of abortion. Indeed, the ultimate irony of 
abortion is that it inherently lets men off the hook." Lynne Marie Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the 
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The mismatch between a law that assumes love can be free and wom-
en's reality that it is not may also have something to do with why radical 
feminists associate intercourse with violence and violation even when it is 
consensual. Most notably, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin 
have argued that even as between the bad choices available to women to-
day, freedom to choose the least bad option (indeed, to make any authentic 
choices about sex) is illusory.208 Male dominance and female submission, 
in their view, are essential elements of sexuality itself.209 "Whatever inter-
course is," says Dworkin, "it is not freedom."210 
Critics of these feminists have condemned them for infantilizing wom-
en who truly desire sex and belittling the suffering of the victims of "real 
rape."211 Their supporters claim they have been misunderstood and miscon-
Boomerang Effect of a Woman's Right to Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 91, 122-23 (1997); see also English, supra note 202, at 479 ("The anti-feminist woman is right 
about one crucial thing: the other woman's right to have an abortion does affect her. It does something 
very simple and, to many women, very upsetting: it takes away their ability not to choose. Where abor-
tion is available, the birth of every baby becomes a willed choice, a purposeful act. And that new factor 
destroys the set of basic assumptions on which many traditional marriages have been based. It breaks 
the rules and wrecks the game. . . . Remember the rules of the old game? They began with this: men 
did not get to have sex with women ... unless they married them . . . . In other words, sex was sup-
posed to incur a major responsibility for men-as it did for women."); id. at 481 ("If a woman gets 
pregnant, the man who twenty years ago might have married her may feel today that he is gallant if he 
splits the cost of an abortion."). 
208 MacKinnon believes that women have so-called consensual intercourse with men because they 
are trapped in the false consciousness of a culture that teaches them that the only measure of a woman's 
worth-her very identity-is through her capacity for sexual violation. See Catharine MacKinnon, 
Pleasure Under Patriarchy, in THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 65, 65-70, 75 (James H. Geer & Wil-
liam T. O'Donohue eds., 1987). 
209 
"When acts of dominance and submission," writes Catharine MacKinnon, "up to and including 
acts of violence, are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex itself, that is what they are. The mutual 
exclusivity of sex and violence is preserved in the face of this evidence by immunizing as 'sex' whatev-
er causes a sexual response and by stigmatizing questioning it as repressive, knowing that what is there-
by exempted includes humiliation and brutality and molestation and murder as well as rape by any 
definition. Violence is sex when it is practiced as sex. If violation of the powerless is part of what is 
sexy about sex, as well as central to the meaning of male and female, the place of sexuality in gender 
and the place of gender in sexuality need to be looked at together. When this is done, sexuality appears 
as the interactive dynamic of gender as an inequality." MacKinnon, The Art of the Impossible, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 74, at I, 6. In Dworkin's words: 
A woman has a body that is penetrated in intercourse . . . . The discourse of male truth ... calls 
that penetration violation. . . . Violation is a synonym for intercourse. . . . Physically, the woman 
in intercourse is a space inhabited, a literal territory occupied literally: occupied even if there has 
been no resistance, no force; even if the occupied person said yes please, yes hurry, yes more. 
Having a line at the point of entry into your body that cannot be crossed is different from not hav-
ing any such line; and being occupied in your body is different from not being occupied in your 
body. 
ANDREA DWORKIN, Occupation/Collaboration, in INTERCOURSE 154, 168 (2006), available at 
http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/Intercoursei.htrnl. 
210 DwoRKIN, supra note 209, at 181. 
211 For debates surrounding the definition of rape, see MARK COWLING, DATE RAPE AND CONSENT 
20-32 (1998); CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART, AND AMERICAN CULTURE 64-65 (1992); ROIPHE, supra 
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strued. In any case, their message and its interpretations have resonated 
broadly-garnering passionate followers and equally passionate oppo-
nents.212 One reason for this resonance might be that the intercourse-equals-
rape formulation, though misattributed,213 taps into a widespread, yet unarti-
culated, discontent. By trivializing the asymmetry in sexual risk-
celebrating the pill as the great equalizer and framing abortion as a privi-
lege214-the current paradigm creates a cognitive dissonance of sorts in 
women's lived experience. The slogans tell women they are free, but they 
are still vomiting through their pregnancies, hemorrhaging through their 
abortions, losing their libido under the pill. 
MacKinnon and Dworkin associate sexual intercourse with violence 
because it involves penetration, subjugation, and lack of control.215 But 
perhaps women who associate intercourse with violence also do so, perhaps 
primarily, because intercourse makes women pregnant and unwanted preg-
nancy is violent. Unwanted pregnancy is violent, effective contraception is 
violent, and abortion is violent. A sexually active woman who doesn't want 
to be a mother gives something up in sex that men never have to put on the 
line.216 
note 200, at 79-82; ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 2 {2003); Robin West, Sex, 
Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 247 n.l {Alan Wertheimer 
& William Miller eds., 2010); Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: 
New Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 337, 348 (1996); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 
YALE L.J. 1087 {1986); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practice and Theory: A Reply to 
Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE. J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 229-30 (1993); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A 
Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387,427-28 {1984); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Fe-
minism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387, 395 (1993). 212 ALexis search of law journals including the phrase "all sex is rape" and MacKinnon and Dwor-
kin yields over sixty hits that include a broad diversity of views. 213 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 143, 
143 (1995) (book review) ("In a telling convergence between left and right, Rush Limbaugh, a conserva-
tive commentator, recently said that I say 'all sex is rape,' repeating a lie that Playboy, a glossy men's 
sex magazine with liberal politics and literary pretensions, has been pushing for years."). 214 See Greer, supra note 90, at 21 {"It is typical of the contradictions that break women's hearts 
that when they availed themselves of their fragile right to abortion they often, even usually, went with 
grief and humiliation to carry out a painful duty that was presented to them as a privilege."). 215 MacKinnon does write that "[p]regnancy and the capacity for pregnancy are broadly and deeply 
connected to many of women's experiences of second-class status." See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, 
supra note 44, at 395. However, her greater emphasis on the act of intercourse itself occludes this cen-
tral point. 216 Germaine Greer expresses a related view: "In order that vaginas can be always and everywhere 
accessible to the male, women are expected to insert devices into the uteri or to take steroids on a daily 
basis. This is interpreted as having the power to choose their reproductive destiny when it is no such 
thing. IUDs provoke infection and heavy bleeding; pills alter the whole metabolism. To accept contra-
ception is to choose between two unacceptable alternatives, forced pregnancy or temporary infertility 
with a greater or lesser degree of present discomfort or malaise and unknown and unguessable long-term 
consequences." Greer, supra note 90, at 22. 
For couples who want to have children, by contrast, the asymmetry can run in the opposite direction 
if the woman's experience of pregnancy is a positive one. See Orgasmic Birth, supra note 21. 
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Sex is complicated. Men and women who don't want babies choose to 
have sex anyway for a variety of reasons-sometimes wholeheartedly, 
sometimes with ambivalence and fear. The critical difference is that when 
women choose sex they are choosing something fundamentally different 
from what men are choosing when they choose sex. Women are choosing 
something that, along with whatever benefits they hope to gain from it, has 
a much higher chance of hurting their bodies.217 Men and women are un-
equal in sex because for women, sex is tinged with something else, a bio-
logical difference that adds a sacrificiallayer.218 
217 It may not be surprising, therefore, that in many instances women are more vigilant than their 
male partners about birth control. Cf Huang & Han, Child Support Enforcement, supra note 99, at 773-
74 (finding that men are more likely to contracept if they expect to be on the hook for child support). 
Women who do not want to conceive and who choose or agree to unprotected sex nevertheless often do 
so in the context of relationships characterized by deep-seated power imbalances. See MACKINNON, 
supra note 74, at 94-95 ( "[A]bortion's proponents and opponents share a tacit assumption that women 
significantly do control sex. . . . Sexual intercourse ... cannot simply be presumed coequally deter-
mined [when] women feel compelled to preserve the appearance ... of male direction of sexual expres-
sion, as if male initiative itself were what we want, as if it were that which turns us on. Men enforce 
this. It is much of what men want in a woman. . . . Under these conditions, women often do not use 
birth control because of its social meaning, a meaning we did not create. Using contraception means 
acknowledging and planning the possibility of intercourse, accepting one's sexual availability, and ap-
pearing non-spontaneous. It means appearing available to male incursions."); see also Ine Vanwesen-
beeck, The Context of Women's Power(/essness) in Heterosexual Interactions, in NEW SEXUAL 
AGENDAS 171, 176 (Lynne Segal ed., 1997). Vanwesenbeeck discusses a study of young women in the 
Netherlands and the UK showing that "[y]oung women are still to a large extent guided by conceptions 
of sexuality as utterly romantic and as natural and spontaneous. Their ideas about sexuality are often 
formulated very vaguely in terms of 'attraction' and 'ecstasy,' ideals which do not provide them with 
concrete operational rules on how to get there. Planning and preparation do not go with romance. Im-
ages of romance and spontaneity prevent young women from explicitly formulating personal wishes, 
and prevent them even more from negotiating them. Negotiation is often perceived as 'being difficult,' 
which is exactly what young women seeking sexual pleasure do not want to be, which means that com-
petent negotiation may only add an extra burden in a situation where sexual pleasure is altogether hard 
to get and difficult enough as it is. In the romantic image of sex, where it all has to happen spontaneous-
ly and 'naturally,' the initiative is often left to 'luck,' to circumstances, to 'being taken by surprise' or to 
the other person ... young women still express a lot of ambivalence concerning sex." /d. Vanwesen-
beeck also discusses a study of prostitutes which concluded that "[c]onsistent condom use with clients 
can be considered an indicator of control over prostitution contact proceedings. Every prostitute wants 
to use condoms, and giving in on that points to a lack of control, generally speaking. So what is the con-
text in which prostitutes become risk-takers where condom use is concerned? . . . [R]isk tak-
ers ... differ significantly from other prostitutes [in that] [t]hey worked under more stressful conditions, 
both in terms of financial need and in terms of working routines .... More of them were drug-users and 
their level of well-being was lower on a range of different criteria: they reported more dissociative expe-
riences, more psychosomatic complaints, more problems that can be put together under the label of 'so-
cial insecurity' and, quite importantly, much less job satisfaction. Last, but definitely not least, they had 
experienced more victimization, both in childhood and in adult life, both off and on the job. They were 
also younger and more often born outside the Netherlands." /d. at 173. 
218 West posits a related concept in her discussion of the psychological survival mechanisms that 
women develop to deal with the pervasive threat of acquisitive and violent male sexuality. She suggests 
that many women control the danger and suppress the fear of being raped by redefining themselves as 
"giving selves." The "giving self' consents to sex, but her consent is first and foremost an act of self 
sacrifice. See West, supra note 106, at 172 ("[A] woman or girl who has defined herself as 'giving' and 
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Some women are prepared to shoulder this burden alone; they have sex 
fully expecting to take care of themselves should an unwanted pregnancy 
occur. But for women who expect more, the knowledge of the asymmetric-
al risk combined with the cultural and legal disregard for it can make con-
sensual sex feel like rape. This may occur during an encounter that is 
consensual but not fully desired.219 It might also occur in the aftermath of 
such an encounter, especially when it results in an unwanted pregnancy for 
which the man is unwilling to share responsibility. Consensual sex is not 
rape, but when a woman grows to expect equality in sex and then discovers 
that when it comes to the unintended consequences of sex she is essentially 
on her own, she may well experience sex generally as abusive. 
The relational default chips away at this basic asymmetry by changing 
the bargaining backdrop of every sexual encounter. Typically, men and 
women negotiate about sex in "private, dispersed, and unofficial circums-
tances ... almost entirely beyond the power of the state to regulate direct-
ly.'mo A relational default fills this gap, dampening the negative effects of 
unequal bargaining indirectly. In chilling casual sex unless both parties 
clearly intend to embrace casual consequences, the proposal breathes life 
into one of the now aspirational aims of marriage without forcing ill-
matched partners into a lifelong bond; it links intercourse with responsibili-
ty for men and women alike. Perhaps it will also result in fewer unintended 
pregnancies, just as higher enforcement of child support has done. The 
her sexuality as 'that which is to be given,' ... will never experience the anxious, ambiguous fear of 
rape by a 'date.' But nor will she experience consensual sex as pleasurable, or if she does, it will be on-
ly incidentally so. She consents to sex for his, not for her pleasure. The sex which is the culmination of 
these dates will be consensual, but it will also be uncomfortable, unpleasant, painful or dangerous. It 
will invite venereal disease (genital sex); bleeding and hemorrhaging (anal sex); gagging and nausea 
(deep oral sex); bruises, lacerations and welts (sadomasochistic sex); and unwanted pregnancy. The giv-
ing self will not experience this pain as a reason to withhold consent, for she is not, by self-definition, a 
being who consents to sexual encounters for her own pleasure or withholds consent if she foresees pain. 
She unquestionably consents, but not to satiate her own desires. She consents to satiate the desires and 
feed the pleasure ofthe other."). 
See also SYLVIA WALBY, THEORIZING PATRIARCHY 125 (1990) (discussing "accomodatory strate-
gies towards sexuality"); Vanwesenbeeck, supra note 217, at 175 (describing research on young women 
in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom showing a lack of having sex for its own sake, instead fo-
cusing on their male partners' satisfaction and needs, often at the expense of their own sexual pleasure). 
219 The distinction between consensual relationship-implicating sex and consensual no-strings-
attached sex which I proposed above is, I believe, a legally useful distinction. A related distinction, 
more elusive but as important from an emotional standpoint, is a distinction Robin West has drawn be-
tween consensual welcomed sex and sex that is consensual but unwelcomed, consensual sex that is not 
fully wanted or desired. West argues that the now dominant consensuaVnonconsensual distinction 
serves us well insofar as it demarcates nonconsensual sex as wrong. It has also misled us, however, by 
implicitly legitimizing all acts of consensual sex. In fact, consensual sex that is unwanted-which is far 
more common than rape, and which is the only kind of sex many girls and women know-carries with it 
serious and generally unrecognized harms. It tends to be physically painful, emotionally abusive, and 
alienating. See West, Sex, supra note 211; West, supra note 106, at 153-54, 214. 
220 HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 10, at 23. 
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truth is that when men share in the price of pleasure, they do a better job of 
minimizing its risks. 221 
2. The Commodification Danger.-To be sure, changes to the rela-
tional default also raise potential dangers. One such danger is that the more 
equitable rule will pressure women--especially poor women-to effective-
ly sell no-strings-attached sex for a price, commodifying the pregnancy 
support entitlement. That is, it may incentivize a type of exchange resem-
bling prostitution, which is illegal in most states.222 
One way to prevent this potential result would be to declare that the 
transfer of more than a de minimus amount of property from one lover to 
the other would invalidate an opt-out agreement. But how should the ap-
propriate "de minimus amount" be set? Should paying for a date or a 
weekend retreat invalidate opt-out? What about a man who helps his lover 
pay for groceries, rent, medication? What if he buys her jewelry or brings 
gifts for her children? 
Even if we could satisfactorily resolve these line drawing questions, 
invalidating opt-out when it appears to be paid for raises a pro-
commodification objection223 : if the law provides a woman with a pregnan-
cy-related entitlement, she should be free to sell that entitlement for a price 
she believes is fair. After all, if every time a woman has sex she risks her 
health, why shouldn't she be paid? And why shouldn't men be able to limit 
their risk exposure by paying a sort of insurance premium upfront? By 
vesting an entitlement in the woman where there was none before, the law 
would correct the fundamental imbalance. What any particular woman 
chooses to do with that entitlement-whether before or after conception-is 
her choice. Even if the price of each opt-out agreement falls short of the 
potential costs of pregnancy, if a woman has multiple partners and if the 
market works efficiently, over time these payments will add up to an 
amount that should roughly match her subjective risk. In this context, how-
ever, the market is especially unlikely to work efficiently. 
221 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
222 Prostitution-like the sale of body parts-is illegal because, among other reasons, we believe 
that the existence of a market in these things will ultimately harm sellers. A market in sex or body parts, 
the anti-commodification argument goes, will lead to "desperate exchanges," pressuring the poor into a 
type of transaction that fundamentally undermines their "personhood." Prostitution opponents also ar-
gue that it harms third parties. For a discussion of the costs of prostitution to participants as well as third 
parties, see Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Sexual Labor, I 06 ETHICS 63, 77-81 (1995). 
223 For a discussion of the dangers of the commodification critique of women's non-market labor, 
see Silbaugh, supra note 177, at 83-84 ("(G]ender equality requires us to take the economics of home 
labor seriously .... (A]s long as so many of women's activities remain non-market and as long as wom-
en's economic welfare is a concern of feminists, economic analysis of non-market activities is affirma-
tively desirable. My objective is to show what can be gained by allowing economics to inform, without 
dominating, the discourse on policy and doctrine surrounding home labor. Concern over women's lives 
becoming entirely commodified seems by comparison an abstract worry."). 
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In other words, the commodification danger raises the familiar and 
much debated "double bind"; both alternatives are potentially harmful.224 
For this reason, the most balanced approach is to craft a default support ob-
ligation with an opt-out alternative providing, however, that opt-out agree-
ments may be voidable for unconsionability. 
3. Expressive Function of the Relational Default.-A third issue is 
that the formal legal obligations I propose might interfere with more organ-
ic, informal arrangements that may ultimately produce more harmonious re-
lationships.225 In most instances, however, a formal legal process would 
never enter the picture. People would largely continue to conduct their sex-
ual and reproductive lives in private, but their choices and relationships 
would take place in the shadow of a more equitable legal norm. Over time, 
women will likely feel more entitled and men will feel more obligated. 
This dynamic, for example, will absolve an economically vulnerable wom-
an from having to be a supplicant, dependant on the magnanimity of her 
male partner for support in a situation where basic fairness requires shared 
responsibility. A relational default is not a punishment; it reflects a basic 
moral obligation. The existence of the new regime might still drive some 
couples into legal conflict where common decency and compromise would 
have produced a better overall result. But on the whole, a clear standard of 
shared responsibility would hopefully influence a social norm that would 
produce fairer results for greater numbers. 
4. Diminishing Anxiety.-A legally prescribed relational baseline al-
so has the potential to alleviate anxieties surrounding sex and its repercus-
sions for both men and women. By failing to hold men accountable to the 
women with whom they conceive, the lovers-as-strangers default fails to 
provide them with a standard, a set of guidelines, a ballpark prescription of 
what "being a good guy" entails. While the fact that men are legally per-
224 The "double bind" of the commodification/noncommodification dilemma was first identified by 
Margaret Jane Radin in her seminal essay, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1915-17 
(1987); see also VNIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PuRCHASE OF INTIMACY (2007) (arguing that economic ne-
gotiation and exchange lurks, unacknowledged, in the background of many intimate relationships). For 
a more recent review of commodification debates, see Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The 
Subject and Object of Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 8 (Martha M. Ertman & 
Joan C. Williams eds., 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=582641. 
For an argument in favor of freedom of contract in the related area of genetic parenthood, see Cohen, 
supra note 94, at 1162-84 (arguing for a waivable right not to be a genetic parent). 
225 This has clearly been one of the unintended consequences of policies requiring mothers applying 
for public assistance to identify the father of their child as a condition for receiving benefits. See Fonta-
na, supra note 173; Bridget Remington, It Takes a Father? Conforming with Traditional Family Values 
as a Condition of Receiving Welfare: Morals Reform and the Price of Privacy, 32 STETSON L. REv. 205, 
223-27 (2002). This is why the relational default I propose, unlike child support, would be fully waiva-
ble, including where the woman receives public assistance. 
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mitted to weasel out of any responsibility drives some men to do just that,226 
at the opposite extreme, the absence of a clear standard drives others to 
make excessively heroic sacrifices in a futile effort to expiate their guilt. 
The current law of conception also leaves women to write their own rules 
on when and whether to disclose an unintended pregnancy.227 The relational 
default will likely diminish this uncertainty, spelling out clear normative 
principles for mutual responsibility and support. 
5. Backlash.-Finally, like many legal reforms, the new paradigm 
raises the possibility of backlash. Women themselves have often played a 
part in trivializing the burdens of pregnancy, and for good reason. Women 
have a vested interest in obscuring the suffering associated with their repro-
ductive capacities because of the very real danger that calling attention to it 
will disempower them.228 Pregnancy-related impairments have and contin-
ue to deter employers from hiring women229 and focus on the risks of abor-
tion may play into the hands of those who wish to re-criminalize it.230 Some 
fifteen years after Danforth established a wife's right to abortion regardless 
of her husband's preferences and just a few months before the Court would 
make its decision in Casey, a Gallup poll found that seventy-three percent 
of Americans believed a wife should be required to obtain her husband's 
consent to undergo an abortion.231 Perhaps admitting the relational perspec-
tive is simply too dangerous for women? 
226 Even in these cases, the results may hann the men as much as they harm their lovers. For a dis-
cussion of the moral, psychological, and spiritual risks to injurers who knowingly deny responsibility for 
harms they have caused, see Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TuL. L. REv. 903, 932-
37 (2005). 
227 For a popular culture illustration of the dilemma, see Sex in the City: Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda 
(HBO television broadcast Aug. 5, 200 I). 
228 See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 170 I 
(1990) ("When we single out pregnancy ... for 'special treatment,' we fear that employers will not hire 
women. But if we do not accord special treatment to pregnancy, women will lose their jobs. If we grant 
special treatment, we bring back the bad old conception of women as weaker creatures; if we do not, we 
prevent women from becoming stronger in the practical world."). 
229 For this reason, some feminists opposed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's definition of preg-
nancy as a "disability." See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 41 
(2003). 
230 More broadly, some feminists fear that harping on our reproductive suffering may revive Victo-
rian prejudices of women as the "gentler" race in need of protection through male-enforced restrictions. 
See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 807-09, 82Q--21 (1989). 
One commentator has dubbed those who advocate laws of this type "protective feminists." See Cathy 
Young, The New Madonna/Whore Syndrome: Feminism, Sexuality, and Sexual Harassment, 38 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 257, 262 (1993) ("The 'new feminism,' in its preoccupation with the sexual 'harm' in-
flicted on women by men-pornography, sexual harassment, and rape (all of which are conflated into a 
single 'continuum' of sexual violence)---inevitably mirrors and reinforces traditional paternalism toward 
women. It might be appropriate, then, to characterize the 'new feminists' as 'protective feminists.'"). 
231 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 354 & n.314 (2009) (citing Frank Newport & 
Leslie McAneny, Whose Court Is It Anyhow?: O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter Position Reflects Abortion 
Views of Most Americans, 322 GALLUP POLL MONTHLY 51 (1992)). 
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Pro-choice readers may worry in particular that requiring men to share 
pregnancy and abortion costs may jeopardize hard won advances securing 
women's rights to abortion. Some fringe men's rights groups are already 
seeking to challenge mandatory child support rules by giving men the right 
to a so-called financial abortion.132 These advocates believe that by paying 
his pregnant partner a sum equal to the cost of an abortion a man should be 
able to "buy" his way out of child support obligations even if she chooses to 
bear the child. The relational default may indeed add fuel to the fire by im-
posing further obligations on men whose partners conceive, although no le-
gal authority takes their claims seriously.233 Just as spouses' duty to support 
each other does not give them veto power over each other's medical choic-
es, a man's duty to participate in the costs of an unintended pregnancy 
should not give him effective veto power over a woman's right to choose an 
abortion. 
Furthermore, the concern that mandatory pregnancy support will in-
crease abortions collapses a critical distinction. While it's true that once 
men have to pay they will have a say, that does not mean they will have the 
final say over abortion. Opening the door to greater male participation in 
women's reproductive decisions is dangerous only if we assume that the 
imbalance of power so heavily tilts towards the man that he will always 
steamroll the woman's preferences. But preliminary data on the influence 
of child support enforcement on the incidence of abortion suggests that the 
opposite may be true.234 To be sure, the concern that once men participate 
in the costs of pregnancy they may pressure women to have (or not to have) 
an abortion is relevant in some cases. It is possible that these cases justify a 
232 See Buchanan, supra note 113, at 1245; Tierney, supra note 113; Sherry F. Co1b, Should Men 
Have the Right to a "Financial Abortion"? A Biological Father Cries Sex Discrimination When Forced 
to Pay Child Support for an Unwanted Baby, FINDLAW, Mar. 21,2006, http://writ.news.find1aw.com/ 
colb/20060321.html; Stephanie Fairyington, The Parent Trap: Paternal Rights and Abortion, 
ELLE.COM, May 17, 2010, http://www.elle.com/Life-Love/Society-Career-Power/The-Parent-Trap-
Paternal-Rights-and-Abortion. For New York Times readers' comments on the issue, see Readers' 
Comments to A Father's Reproductive Rights: What happens when a man makes his intentions clear 
before a child is conceived or born?, http://community.nytimes.com/comments/parenting.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2010/05/17/a-fathers-reproductive-rights/?sort=newest (last visited Aug. 15, 2010) (many 
commenters asserting that a man should have no right to prevent a women from having an abortion and 
should be required to pay child support for a child he does not want, while a some argue a man's opposi-
tion to a woman's decision to take a pregnancy to term should exempt him from having to pay child 
support). 
233 Payne, supra note 113, § 2(a) (''To date, the courts have refused to deem a woman's decision to 
bear a child despite the objections of the child's father, even where he has offered to pay for an abortion, 
to create an unconstitutional infringement on the father's federal or state equal protection or due process 
rights."). 
234 The number of abortions falls as the expectation that men will have to pay child support rises 
because women are "encouraged by the potential economic security that the father may provide." Crow-
ley, supra note 100, at 22. A similar dynamic may lead pregnant women considering an abortion be-
cause they are worried about loss of income due to their pregnancy to take it to term once they know 
additional pregnancy support will be coming. 
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lovers-as-strangers default, but over the long haul the current rule may do 
more harm than good. "Protecting" women by assigning to them most of 
the material burdens of pregnancy and abortion perpetuates the perception 
that pregnancy is a woman's problem. Pregnancy that results from consen-
sual sex where the parties have not agreed on a no-strings-attached type ar-
rangement concerns both parties to the act. The law should treat it 
accordingly. 
Gender neutral laws can have gendered effects when they operate in 
the context of a gendered world. The notion that conception is a private 
problem has radically different implications for men and for women. So-
ciety is moving closer to acknowledging and addressing the multiple com-
plexities of reproduction-that pregnancy can be debilitating and that a 
world that enables pregnant workers to keep their jobs is better than one 
that confines them to the private sphere; that abortion is potentially harmful 
and it may still be a woman's best option. My hope is that bringing wom-
en's reproductive realities out of the shadows will advance, rather than 
threaten, their freedoms. The alternative-remaining silent-implicitly en-
dorses a view of "reproductive freedom" that leaves women to bear the bur-
dens of pregnancy alone. 
CLOSING REMARKS 
I have suggested that sex creates a unique type of relationship, and that 
sex that results in pregnancy extends this relationship. But the law treats 
lovers as strangers. It treats nonprocreative sex through an ideological 
framework of separation rather than connection, of free love rather than mu-
tual responsibility. The current default contradicts mainstream expectations 
about sex and basic intuitions about fairness. Instead, this Article proposes 
a new relational paradigm that establishes minimal notification and support 
obligations between sexual partners who conceive. 
The relational default requires further study before it can be imple-
mented. In the meantime, however, we don't need the law to start changing 
our lives.235 Each one of us-as individuals and lovers, siblings and friends, 
teachers and parents--can start now by asking: what is our own personal 
law of conception? What do we want it to be? Have we chosen the rules 
that govern our love lives deliberately, or have we adopted them passively, 
unreflectively? These are difficult questions to ask. Going along without 
asking is easier. Going along doesn't ruin the moment, but each time we 
put on the blinders we drift further from our intuitive capacity to listen and 
235 In the context of discussing the utopian nature of her theory, Martha Fineman writes: ''The pro-
duction of practical suggestions is not the only justification for theory, however. Sometimes re-
visioning, even if utopian, is valuable simply because it forces us to look at old relationships in new 
lights and thereby understand some things about how we perceive the natural or normal, as well as how 
we create the deviant." See FINEMAN, supra note II, at 232. 
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to feel for the answers. Going along distances us; it distances us from our-
selves and it distances us from our lovers. 
Asking these questions and talking about them openly will not merely 
clear the air of misunderstandings. The process of asking and sharing has 
the potential itself to begin to sensitize us to our own and to our lovers' true 
desires. It may help us to identify what inspires and what deadens, what 
lifts and what oppresses, what heals and what injures. And it may lead us to 
be more mindful about our choices. 
In life there are no guarantees. Men and women who do not want 
children have sex anyway despite the wild roll-of-the-dice that it entails. 
This is the fundamental risk at the heart of making love. This is the true 
price of pleasure, a price no law can erase. But the law can-indeed it in-
evitably does-set the baseline. It is up to us to decide where. 
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